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Russia has been involved in two major geopolitical conflicts in recent years:            
the Ukraine crisis and the civil war in Syria. Since Russia’s involvement in             
the Ukraine crisis in 2013-2014, many commentators have pointed to the           
effectiveness of the Russian strategic narratives to explain the support the           
Kremlin enjoys at home and abroad. Although Russia's use of information as            
a weapon is not new, in the light of the limited transparency of Russian              
strategic thinking, studying Russia’s discursive environment and, in        
particular, strategic narratives becomes critical. Therefore, the concept of         
strategic narrative plays a central role in assembling the main argument for            
this doctoral thesis. The concept provides a foundation for the analytical           
framework to explore a set of media frames purposefully embedded into           
television news to reinforce, subvert, undermine, overwhelm or replace a          
pre-existing discourse on a subject significant to both the audience and the            
‘speaker’ that is often a political elite. 
The main focus of the dissertation is on the visuals employed in the             
Russian television news, which have received surprisingly little scholarly         
attention to date. A starting point is the desire to obtain a deeper             
understanding of how the Russian government’s complex and controversial         
political decisions are legitimized on television, and also, and most          
importantly, to determine what role images play in advancing the strategic           
narratives that justify violence, human costs and engagement in military          
conflicts. For that, I adopt three distinct perspectives. First is a comparative            
perspective, which contrasts the narratives produced for two different         
audiences — domestic and foreign. It also compares the strategic narratives           
constructed around two different conflicts — the military conflict in Eastern           
Ukraine and the civil war in Syria. Second is a retrospective perspective,            
which explores the narratives not only in terms of their current application            
but also as a process that has been evolving over a two-year period of time.               
Third, the dissertation employs a hybrid media perspective to explore the           
interactions between mainstream media and social media. These three         
perspectives, in combination, encompass a comprehensive and longitudinal        
investigation of Russian strategic narratives as a representation of the          
weaponized information. The combination of qualitative and quantitative        




The thesis represents a compilation of four articles. Each article          
illuminates one of three perspectives adopted in the dissertation. The articles           
highlight the results which demonstrate that the approach adopted in this           
dissertation is important for several reasons. First, while much of the media            
and international relations literature focuses on projection or reception of          
strategic narratives, there is almost no research which offers deep insights           
into strategic narrative as a process that can develop or be modified over the              
course of time to account for changes in political goals or target audiences.             
What happens to a dominant, established strategic narrative when the          
context changes? This dissertation aims to fill this gap by studying Russia’s            
dominant strategic narratives in television news from comparative,        
retrospective and hybrid media perspectives. Second, this dissertation argues         
that strategic narratives gain their power through images that invoke          
collective emotions and ideas, like sympathy or aversion while reinforcing          
existing political myths, cultural stereotypes and historical memory. Thus,         
the thesis conceptualises visual images as affective anchors that can be used            
to reactivate collective memory and dominant discourses and construct         
emotional relationships between the audiences and mediated events. Finally,         
wartime images studies anticipate, but rarely empirically examine the         
television images that are employed to mediate the contemporary conflicts.          
This dissertation extends the understanding of how the Russian television          
visually mediates the conflicts to advance the state’s interpretation of the           
events and justify the country’s involvement in the international conflicts to           
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discuss my work with you. I send my warmest thanks to ​Janne            
Matikainen ​, University Lecturer and ​Johanna Sumiala​, Associate       
Professor for their kind willingness to represent the grading committee          
during the public defence.  
I would like to say my thanks to ​Janne Matikainen also for some other              
reasons. Back in 2011, Janne was my first employer at the University of             
Helsinki as a director of the Communication Research Centre CRC. That           
work was precious and, indeed, very much needed. I remember and greatly            
appreciate the time when I could bring my little son to Janne’s office and              
discuss our work with him while my child was playing or sleeping by my side.               
Our collaboration resulted in two co-authored papers and my work in the            
CRC as a whole was a great contribution to my research career. I thank you,               





At the time of finalizing this dissertation, I was blessed to meet ​Minna             
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during all this time. Beyond that, I am very grateful to Minna for choosing              
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1 I​NTRODUCTION​: S​TORY​ ​MATTERS 
Russia has been involved in two major geopolitical conflicts in recent years:            
the crisis in Ukraine and the civil war in Syria. In Ukraine, the crisis includes               
the Euromaidan protests 2013-2014, an overthrow of the government, the          
loss of a part of Ukraine’s territory (annexation of Crimea) and the violent,             
still ongoing military conflict where the Ukrainian government forces         
confront the separatist militias backed by the Kremlin (Cottle, 2016;          
Thomson, 2017). I use the term ‘crisis’ to encompass all these events while             
considering the situation in Ukraine in a wider context (Szostek, 2018a;           
Valuch and Hamuľák, 2018). The official Kyiv and the West continue           
accusing Russia of interference in the Ukraine crisis and, in particular,           
supporting the military forces of the separatist republics. The Russian          
government, however, denies its involvement (Freedman, 2019).  
In September 2015, Russia intervened militarily in Syria following a          
formal request by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s government. Russia         
officially justified its intervention as an intention to support the Assad regime            
as part of the global campaign against terrorism. In terms of international            
politics, both the crisis in Ukraine and Russia’s military operation in Syria led             
to a heightened confrontation between Russia and Ukraine and the worst           
relations between Russia and the US and Europe since the early 1980s, when             
that relationship was driven by bitter superpower rivalry (Charap and          
Shapiro, 2015; Trenin, 2014).  
In addition, both conflicts have been accompanied by remarkable         
campaigns in the Russian media to mobilize public support for the           
interventions. The conflicts trigger claims that Russia has raised information          
war to a new level, as it effectively manages national and international            
perceptions of these conflicts through its use of mainstream media and by            
controlling internet discussions (Allen and Moore, 2018; Hammond-Errey,        
2019; Hoskins and O’Loughlin, 2015; Hutchings and Szostek, 2015; Jensen,          
2018; Lucas and Pomeranzev, 2016; Moore, 2019; Roman et al., 2017; Rugge,            
2018). Since relations between Russia and other states continue to be tense            
and complex, information warfare has become a serious security concern          
globally, but especially to the ‘frontline states’: Poland, the Baltic states, the            
Czech Republic, Slovakia and Ukraine (Lucas and Pomeranzev, 2016).         
Academics and politicians explore contemporary information warfare       
strategies with increasing interest to critically assess the strategies’ role and           
potential capacity in geopolitical conflicts, international relations and        
domestic policies (Butler, 2010; Cottiero et al., 2015; De Graaf et al. 2015;             




In this context, ​strategic narratives have come to the fore ​as an            
instrument used by political actors to construct a nexus of          
political activities and messages within a compelling narrative        
framework advanced through the media and aimed at positing a          
particular version of events (Miskimmon et al., 2017), ​gaining         
legitimacy (Roselle, 2006) ​and cultivating public support (Brown,        
2005; Dimitriu, 2012). The concept of strategic narratives plays a central role            
in assembling the main argument for this dissertation by providing the           
foundation of the analytical framework used to study the discursive          
environment in which political elites operate, manage public expectations         
and wield their influence (Roselle et al., 2014).  
Russia has long been credited with having significant information         
warfare capabilities (Iasiello, 2017) and using them through agitation and          
propaganda to mobilize its population (Kenez, 1985). The literature provides          
an insight into how modern Russian information warfare stems from Soviet           
propaganda techniques that relied heavily on strategic narratives,        
disinformation and isolation (Allen and Moore, 2018; Iasiello, 2017; Jack,          
2017; Kragh and Åsberg, 2017; Kuzio, 2019). Some scholars argue that Russia            
continues to use Soviet-style propaganda practices, merely adapting them to          
the contemporary context (Galeotti, 2016, 2017; Giles, 2016), while others          
suggest that Russian information warfare is now much more sophisticated          
and intense (Lucas and Pomeranzev, 2016; Roudakova, 2017). Thus,         
although Russian government’s use of information as a weapon is not new            
(Allen and Moore, 2018; Bouwmeester, 2017; Giles, 2016), studying Russia’s          
discursive environment and especially its strategic narratives has become         
critical, given the limited transparency of Russian strategic thinking. 
Russian television holds a key position in advancing the strategic          
narratives of the government. There are two main rationales explaining this           
specific type of authorities-population interaction in Russia. First, the         
relationship between media and power in modern Russia is often          
characterized by state paternalism (Kiriya, 2019) and tight control         
implemented through financial and administrative regulations of media        
owners and journalists (Voinova, et al., 2007), especially when it comes to            
the national TV (Dunn, 2014; Hutchings and Rulyova, 2009). The particular           
interplay of economic and political factors creates the environment, where          
the media plays a role of an ‘obedient child’ (Vartanova, 2013: p. 109) and              
causes de-professionalisation of journalism which occurs when the mass         
media products are increasingly used for political purposes (Roudakova,         
2017). 
Second, ​television remains the main news source for roughly 85% of           
the Russian population (Volkov, 2016). Szostek (2018b) claims that the          




resonance among diverse domestic audiences, even those who distrust state          
media and turn to alternative sources. In the same vein, Cottiero et al. (2015)              
conclude that the role of television in Russia is so significant that there is no               
discernible difference between opinions shared by ​television viewers and         
internet users. Indeed, the rapid expansion of the internet and social media            
has made it more difficult to impose hegemonic narratives or framings of the             
conflicts (Hoskins and O’Loughlin, 2015; Kaempf, 2013; Roselle et al., 2014).           
Nevertheless, the Russian government tries to produce competing narratives         
and incorporate online users to reproduce and amplify the narratives          
originated in mainstream media (Jaitner and Mattsson, 2015; Mejias and          
Vokuev, 2017). 
The news genre is especially important for the purpose of this research            
due to its ideological weight. Traditionally news is understood as important           
or urgent information delivered in a timely manner to people who want to             
know it (Bennett, 2016: p. 2). The television news in modern Russia            
represents a platform for promoting identity claims (Hutchings and         
Miazhevich, 2010: p. 179) and, through numerous repetitions, confirming         
and reinforcing them (Hutchings and Rulyova, 2009: p. 47). This approach,           
as well as the nexus of power and mainstream media in Russia, bolsters my              
rationale for selecting news to study strategic narratives advanced through          
the state-run television channels.  
 Despite the prominent position of mainstream television in Russia’s         
media and political landscapes, there are two areas that have ​received           
surprisingly little scholarly attention to date. ​First is the strategic narratives           
constructed in television news. One important reason for that is the           
communicative complexity of television news, which is associated with its          
polysemic nature (Grabe and Bucy, 2009), in which visuals are intensively           
applied in tandem with text and audio underlays (Griffin, 2010; Trivundza,           
2004; Wilkes, 2015). Second is the visuals that are selected to advance the             
strategic narratives in the news. At the same time, the power of visuals is              
greater today than ever before (Griffin, 2018). Rapidly developing digital          
technologies enable faster and easier production of images and their global           
dissemination. The combination of moving images and text is the most           
ubiquitous form of a message in modem media, and their highly complex            
interactions are especially important in coverage of conflicts and wars          
(Brantner et al., 2011; Parry 2010b). Excluding images from any analysis           
could lead to incomplete and even misleading conclusions.  
Thus, ​the present study aims to fill these gaps by focusing on            
the visual dimension of strategic narratives advanced by the         
Russian television news and presuming that image selection        
influences evaluation of a journalistic story. The starting point of this           
study is the desire to obtain a deeper understanding of how the Russian             




television news and to determine what role images play in advancing the            
strategic narratives. My goal is based first and foremost on the position that             
television images are an important mode of war reporting (Chouliaraki,          
2006; Hoskins, 2004; Hoskins and O’Loughlin, 2007). Furthermore,        
scholars recognize the vital position of visuals in promoting strategic          
narratives during political and armed conflicts (Butler, 2010; Miskimmon et          
al., 2015; Mirzoeff, 2011; Virilio, 2002, 2009). Finally, valuable theoretical          
and empirical studies have particularly emphasised the crucial role that          
images play in influencing public responses to wars and inducing ideological           
sentiments (Fahmy and Kim, 2008; Michalski and Gow, 2007; Parry, 2010a;           
Seo and Ebrahim, 2016). Hence, my core research question is the following: 
How does Russian television news visually advance the        
strategic narratives related to the Ukraine crisis and the civil war           
in Syria?  
To answer this question ​and advance the existing knowledge about          
strategic narratives, I adopt three distinct perspectives. First is a comparative           
perspective, which contrasts the narratives produced for two different         
audiences — domestic and foreign. It also compares the strategic narratives           
constructed around two different conflicts — the military conflict in Eastern           
Ukraine and the civil war in Syria (Articles I and IV). Second is a              
retrospective perspective, which explores the narratives not only in terms of           
their current application but also as a culmination of a process that has been              
evolving over a two-year period of time (Article III). Third, the dissertation            
employs a hybrid media perspective to explore the interactions between          
mainstream media and social media and the spread of fake news (Article II).             
These three perspectives, in combination, encompass a comprehensive and         
longitudinal investigation of Russian strategic narratives as a representation         
of the weaponized information. The combination of qualitative and         
quantitative methods adds ‘depth’ and ‘breadth’ dimensions to the         
dissertat ​ion’s analytical spectrum. 
The approach adopted in this dissertation is important for several          
reasons. First, while much of the media and international relations literature           
focuses on projection or reception of strategic narratives, there is almost no            
research which offers deep insights into strategic narrative as a process that            
can develop or be modified over the course of time to account for changes in               
political goals or target audiences. What happens to a dominant, established           
strategic narrative when the context changes? This dissertation aims to fill           
this gap by studying Russia’s dominant strategic narratives in television news           
from comparative, retrospective and hybrid media perspectives. Second, this         
dissertation argues that strategic narratives gain their power through images          
that invoke collective emotions and ideas, like sympathy or aversion while           




memory. Thus, the thesis conceptualises visual images as affective anchors          
that can be used to reactivate collective memory and dominant discourses           
and construct emotional relationships between the audiences and mediated         
events. Finally, wartime images studies anticipate, but rarely empirically         
examine the television images employed to mediate the contemporary         
conflicts. This dissertation extends the understanding of how the Russian          
television visually mediates the conflicts to advance the state’s interpretation          
of the events and justify the country’s involvement in international conflicts           




Background of the study 
2. B ​ACKGROUND​ ​OF​ ​THE​ ​STUDY​: ​ORIGINS​ ​OF 
INFORMATION​ ​WARFARE​ ​AND​ ​THE​ ​CONTEMPORARY​ ​MEDIA 
ENVIRONMENT​ ​IN​ R ​USSIA 
Russian information warfare has recently taken a central place in the           
scholarly analysis (Darczewska, 2014; Huhtinen et al., 2019; Kasapoglu,         
2015; Lucas and Pomeranzev, 2016; Perry, 2015; Rácz, 2015; Snegovaya,          
2015). Since strategic narratives are often described as part of information           
warfare (Nissen, 2013; Oates, 2014; Roselle, 2010), it is appropriate to begin            
with a description of the origins of information warfare and contemporary           
information politics in Russia. Building on existing research on the history of            
propaganda, communication policies, freedom of the press and online         
censorship in Russia, this chapter explores the practices of Soviet          
propaganda that have contributed to Russian information warfare and the          
current relationship between the Russian government and media, which has          
created favourable conditions for advancing the regime’s strategic narratives. 
I have identified three relevant spheres of power and media relations.           
The first pertains to propaganda and censorship routines rooted in Russian           
history (section 2.1). The second describes the state mechanisms of seizing           
control over key mass media players in contemporary Russia (section 2.2).           
The third concerns extending political filters to online information flows          
through legislative and technical frameworks (section 2.3). The chapter also          
provides brief summaries about two international conflicts – the Ukraine          
crisis and the Syrian civil war – that have triggered claims about new levels of               
Russian information warfare and provide the context for this study (sections           
2.4). 
2.1. ​H ​ISTORY ​ ​OF​ ​INFORMATION ​ ​POLITICS ​ ​IN ​ R ​USSIA ​: ​PROPAGANDA ​, 
MOBILIZATION ​ ​AND ​ ​CONTROL 
Russian information warfare is hardly a new phenomenon. Some scholars          
argue that it is rooted in the country’s history and national identity (Chotikul,             
1986; Kenez ​, 1985; ​Simons and Strovsky, 2006; Thomas, 1998). Chotikul          
(1986) and Simons and Strovsky (2006) hold that the authoritarian          
traditions emerged as a result of Russia’s severe climate and living           
conditions, along with the hardships related to an immense territory that was            
vulnerable to att ​acks on all sides. In this view, the rule of a strong totalitarian               
leader was the only way to unite people and survive under these            




This authoritarian political regime defines the functions of the media          
in society. In her work about the development of media control in Russia,             
Ognyanova (2010) discusses Vedomosti, the country’s first newspaper. It was          
established in 1702 by Peter I the Great as a means of informing the              
population about his plans and aspirations. The newspaper was fully          
controlled by the monarch; he was its only editor and one of its most prolific               
contributors. Ognyanova (2010) stressed that, not unlike the press that          
appeared later in the Russian history, ​Vedomosti was never used to serve the             
citizens; its only goal was to popularize the current priorities of the country             
and its tsar. Ognyanova (2010) concludes that, in contrast to a Western press             
largely driven by market competition and private interests, Russian news          
media have always been primarily a political tool (p. 4). 
The later traditions of propaganda and disinformation of the Soviet          
Union have also impacted today’s Russian media structure (Allen and Moore,           
2018; ​Ia​siello, 2017; Jack, 2017; Kragh and Åsberg, 2017; Lucas and           
Pomeranzev, 2016; Snegova​ya, 2015; Vartanova, 2013). In​deed, Soviet        
leaders placed an extraordinarily high value on using information for the           
purposes of political indoctrination and control (Taylor, 1998). This control,          
which came to be called ‘reflexive control’ in the Soviet view and within the              
Marxist-Leninist paradigm, is best exercised by purposefully influencing the         
inputs an individual receives from his or her environment through          
manipulation and management of perceptions (Bouwmeester, 2017;       
Chotikul, 1986: pp. 43–45; Huhtinen et al., 2019; Thomas, 2004). ​Thomas           
(2004​: p. 253) defines reflexive control as a ‘manipulation of thought           
processes’; it is similar to the Western concept of perception management           
but is arguably more than that, as it attempts not only to manipulate             
perceptions but also to control reactions to these manipulations. In other           
words, reflexive control involves creating a behavioural pattern or providing          
specially designed information, partial information or, most often, plain         
disinformation that causes an opponent to react in a predetermined fashion           
– as if b ​y reflex – without realizing that he or she is being manipulated               
(Huhtinen et al., 2019; Thomas, 2004). 
Vladimir Lefebvre, who Chotikul (1986) describes as having developed         
the concept of reflexive control in the 1960s, emphasizes that any           
information act deliberately designed for a specific purpose, provocation,         
intrigue and even calumny – or more generally a falsehood of any type –              
creates reflexive control. He believes it blurs the line between lie and truth             
and makes it extremely difficult to distinguish fabricated information from          
information that corresponds to reality (Bouwmeester, 2017). The trick is to           
mix everything up so that, in the end, the public cannot see the forest for the                
trees (Lefebvre, 2015). Reflexive control has also been identified as a range of             
systems, methods and tasks intended to influence the perception and          
behaviour of an enemy, a population or the international community on all            
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levels (Bouwmeester, 2017). In other words, it is a systemic approach based            
on the perception management that uses information to alter a target           
opponents’ (or the public) orientation so that they make decisions favourable           
to the political regime’s goals (Selhorst, 2016; Shemayev, 2007). Thus,          
beyond deception, reflexive control also embeds the strategic promotion of          
specific narratives and propaganda. 
In contrast with the Western approach, the concept of propaganda in           
the Soviet Union was used in a positive sense, as more or less equivalent to               
enlightenment. In the third edition of the ​Large Soviet Encyclopedia          
(​Prohorov​, 1977: p. 172), the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) is             
defined as a people’s ideological educator that conducts everyday propaganda          
and agitation activities, manages mass communication (press, television,        
radio, etc.) to make every communist follow the moral values stated in the             
Programme and CPSU Rules and inculcate these values in other workers. In            
addition, major addresses delivered by Lenin, Stalin, Kruschev and other          
Soviet leaders to the Congresses of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union             
(the Soviet regime’s main political events) emphasized the central role of           
agitation and propaganda in the flourishing of Soviet Communist ideology          
(Barghoorn, 2015: p. 5).  
Thus, in the Soviet tradition, propaganda was a legalized and          
instituti​onalized mode of communication between official agencies and the         
population, aimed at cultivating and promoting strategic narratives and         
political values. Hannah ​Arendt (1973) wrote that the goal of Soviet (and            
Nazi) propaganda was not persuasion but organization or, in the Soviet           
context, physical and emotional mobilization within a certain framework of          
ideas. Kotkin (2001) notes that everything in the Soviet Union was ultimately            
based on this kind of mass mobilization: the five-year (industrial) plans,           
collectivization, anti-religious and anti-illiteracy campaigns and the ‘building        
of socialism’ in the republics (p. 133). Kotkin (2001) defines mobilization as a             
government’s powerful tactic of engaging people in activities through their          
emotional commitment to a certain idea. The only way to keep people            
constantly mobilized was the state’s monopoly over mass media and strict           
and total control over the information that passed through media outlets           
(Bauer and Gleicher, 1953).  
The mobilization of the entire population became the Soviet media’s          
paramount official goal when the USSR was invaded by Nazi Germany           
(Berkhoff, 2012: p. 4). The image of family (Mother Russia / Motherland and             
Father Stalin) lay at the heart of the media’s effort to nurture the most              
powerful form of patriotism by representing the war in personal and           
emotionally compelling terms. In her study of World War II propaganda,           
Lisa Kirschenbaum (2000) noted that figuring patriotism in terms of family           
ties enabled the linkage of markers of party loyalty with hometown nostalgia            




(1993) pointed out that the practice of conflating the tragedies and interests            
of families and of the nation allowed Stalin’s image to have an            
unquestionably crucial mobilizing effect during World War II. Among the          
most common tactics during the wartime was crafting reports about          
individual heroes and printing ‘personal’ letters in the press. The same           
strategy was visible in other forms of propaganda and wartime popular           
cu ​lture like posters, books and movies that linked family, hometown and           
nation (Kirschenbaum, 2000; Shin, 2015). 
This approach, according to Kirschenbaum (2000), revealed an effort         
to re ​present the war in an emotionally authentic, if not factually accurate,            
way and to emphasize the degree to which the war could and should be              
understood by means of individuals’ responses to it. ‘​Family’ metaphors in           
Soviet times represented a salient layer of associations and emotional          
anchors ​(A'Beckett, 2012) ​. The several republics in the USSR were ‘brothers’,           
while the USSR itself was often defined as ​rodina-mat ​, ​or ‘motherland /            
mother-state’ (Wierzbicka, 1996: p. 192). These familial terms were         
emotionally and ideologically loaded and became a symbol of the unity and            
loyalty of the Soviet Socialist Republics. The slogan ‘fraternal solidarity with           
workers all over the world’ was included in the Moral Codex of Communist             
Builders. 
Indeed, the trauma from World War II is still used, sometimes to a             
remarkable extent, in the modern politics of Russia. The powerful legacy of            
that war still frames Russians’ understanding of a conflict as a battle between             
‘good’ and ‘evil’. Through mediated memories and commemorative rituals,         
fiction, music and monuments that repeat, reinforce or renegotiate people’s          
beliefs about wartime experiences, Russian strategic narratives have turned         
the trauma of war into stories that can be situated within the modern             
conventions of public display (Cronqvist and Sturfelt, 2018). On the one           
hand, this can be explained by the urgent need for the Russian authorities to              
find a common ideological background that could serve as a basis for the             
integration of the whole of Russian society after the Soviet Union collapsed            
(Polegkyi, 2016: p. 78). On the other, due to recently strident Russian            
demands to play a greater role in international politics, the symbolic capital            
of the victory over Nazi Germany in World War II is employed by the Russian               
government to strengthen Russia’s position as a great power and to restore            
Russia’s control over what is known as the ‘near-abroad’ (the areas near            
Russia that overlay fairly well with its traditional sphere of influence)           
(Pol ​egkyi, 2016: p. 82).  
Thus, the great power status manipulation also originates in the Soviet           
past. Havi​ng made a decisive contribution to the defeat of Hitler’s Germany,            
the Soviet Union came out of the war as an undisputed global power             
(Pechatnov, 2010: p. 1), which meant both new opportunities and new           
challenges for Kremlin propaganda. The opportunities included a chance to          
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prove the Soviet ideological supremacy and promote this image far and wide.            
However, these opportunities could not be fully exploited due to the           
challenges posed by the ruined economy and exhausted populace of the           
post-war Soviet Union. State propaganda, mass culture, education and the          
work of the Soviet mass media in particular again became the central and             
most important resources of Stalin’s government to organize people within          
the Soviet ideological framework (Brooks, 2000; Stites, 1999; Tumarkin,         
1994). Orchestrated by the Department of Agitation and Propaganda of the           
Communist Party Central Committee (Agitprop) and the Communist        
Information Bureau (Cominform, established in 1947), the propaganda        
campaigns grew more sophisticated and diverse, constructing the strategic         
narratives about and mobilizing people against a new enemy represented by           
erstwhile Western allies (Shaw, 2001: p. 60). 
Indeed, people’s increasing post-war frustration demanded a       
scapegoat for the worsening conditions of life and political pressure. In ​A            
Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev             
(2009), Vladislav Zubok describes how Soviet propaganda managed to direct          
this frustration towards the Western countries. He writes that most Soviet           
citizens tended to believe the official propaganda that blamed the lack of            
immediate improvements in their lives on the former Western allies and,           
most importantly, revered Stalin more than ever as a great leader (p. 6).             
Zubok also emphasizes that Stalin successfully used the notions of the great            
power, collective glory and ritualistic mourning for the dead, all related to            
World War II, as central features of his Cold War propaganda. The cult of              
World War II allowed Stalin ‘to carry out his foreign policy and to stamp out               
potential discontent and dissent at home’ (p. 6).  
Ivan Zassoursky (1999) points out that, shortly before the Soviet          
Union collapsed, the relationship between the media and government in          
Russia changed. Instead of being totally subordinated to the government, the           
media became dependent on various corporate players and oligarchic capital.          
Censorship was still prevalent, but the media started serving a number of            
different (and often contradictory) commercial interests. In the context of the           
Soviet Union, this was a new pluralistic phenomenon. During that period,           
newspapers experienced a striking drop in circulation and influence         
(Zassoursky, 1999). The government stopped subsidizing newspapers, which        
increased their prices and ruined their distribution system. Television,         
already an influential source, became the most powerful medium in the           
country (Ognyanova, 2010). 
2.2. P​UTIN​’​S​ R ​USSIA ​: ​TIGHTENING​ ​CONTROL​ ​OVER ​ ​MASS​ ​MEDIA 
Vladimir Putin seems to be trying to rebuild a hierarchical and strongly            




originating in Russia’s past. In 2001, the second year of his presidency, Putin             
signed a decree that fully re-established federal control over the entire           
national network of broadcasting and relay stations for television and radio           
signals. The state-owned Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting        
Network (RTRN) started controlling the broadcasting stations through        
regulating technical infrastructure, administrating nancial operations and       
formally and informally in uencing news ows (Vartanova, n.d.). By 2018,          
RTRN covered up to 98,4% of the Russian population with the first multiplex             
(an essential package of ten free on-air digital TV channels including Channel            
One, Russia-1 and NTV) (rtrs.ru, n.d.).  
Also, the government agencies ensure that the state remains the key           
actor in defining the framework for the media business through          
policy-making and regulatory activities (Galkina and Lehtisaari, 2016) and         
direct or indirect owning (financial supporting) of media companies         
(Vartanova, 2019). Thus, for example, the largest media companies such as           
Russia-1 TV channel, national dailies ​Rossiskaya Gazeta​, news agencies         
TASS and MIA ​Rossija Segodnya belong to the state agency ​Vserossiyskaya           
gosudarstvennaya televizionnaya i radioveshchatelnaya kompaniya     
(All-Russia State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company - VGTRK);         
Channel One is shared between the government (51%) and private companies           
(National Media Group and VTB Bank); and NTV is owned by           
Gazprom-Media, the government-controlled company (Vartanova, 2019). 
In addition, control over mass media includes pressure and even          
crimes against journalists and media outlets. In 2002, the Committee to           
Protect Journalists (CPJ, 2002) reported that President Putin’s        
administration was either directly involved in or held responsible for a broad            
range of abuses against independent media outlets. The top executives of           
many critically-minded media outlets have been reshuffled, including RIA         
Novost ​i​, Ekho Moskvy, TV Rain, and Lenta.ru Horbyk, 2015). ​The CPJ           
(2002) also mentioned NTV (previously the only independent television         
network in Russia with national reach), TV-6 (a private network with           
national reach) and ​Nezavisimaya Gazeta and ​Novaya Gazeta (opposition         
newspapers) as victims of state pressure that led to temporary or permanent            
blocking of the independent media’s professional activities, ownership        
transformations or a significant softening of critical attitudes towards the          
government.  
During the first decade of this century, favourable conditions in the           
energy market, the elimination of oligarchs’ influence and victory in the           
Second Chechen War allowed Putin and his retinue to put the political            
system completely under their control (Hajduk and Stępniewski, 2016: p.          
40). Reporters criticizing the authorities on either state or regional levels           
were threatened, attacked and even murdered because of their investigative          
work; examples include Anna Politkovskaya, Mikhail Afanasyev and        
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Akhmednabi Akhmednabiyev (Article 19, 2013: p. 3). Article 19 (2013) argues           
that these cases are emblematic of the way in which the Russian authorities             
have reshaped the media landscape of contemporary Russia.  
Thus, by the beginning of the 2010s, the media system in Russia            
represented the government-commercial Eurasian model, synthesizing      
“European” characteristics of commercialization and “Asian” features of        
authoritarian control of the government (Vartanova, 2013; Pasti and         
Nordenstreng, 2013). The regime’s tightening grip over the media led some           
observers to make parallels with the Soviet legacy (Oates, 2007; Vartanova,           
2012). Oates (2007: p. 1288), for example, describes the media system in            
Putin’s Russia as a ‘neo-Soviet model’, arguing that such high levels of            
propaganda, self-censorship and government control in Russia are possible         
because they are close to natural, an inheritance from the Soviet past. The             
prefix ‘neo’ constitutes the new features of the modern media system that are             
necessary to respond to market forces and countenance physical violence          
against journalists (Oates, 2007: p. 1296).  
Self-censorship and government control do not necessarily mean that         
there is perfect continuity with Soviet times, however. Becker (2004, 2014)           
argues that the Soviet legacy has much less impact on the contemporary            
relations between media and government in Russia and that Oates’s concept           
of a neo-Soviet media system is thus not accurate. Instead, Becker (2004,            
2014) proposes the term ‘neo-authoritarian’ to describe Russia’s media         
system, meaning that it has more in common with the systems of other             
non-democratic countries like China or Venezuela than with the Soviet          
Union. This concept, according to Becker, better explains the power          
relationships by which the government increases its control over the media           
only episodically when an issue is critical to the political leadership (Becker,            
2014: p. 196). The rest of the time, this neo-authoritarian media system is             
distinguished by an increased amount of tabloid-style popular entertainment         
content designed to divert the population (Walker and Orttung, 2014: p. 75;            
see also Laruelle, 2014). 
The neo-authoritarian media system model successfully captures       
developments regarding state-controlled broadcasters prior to 2012. Since        
that year, when Putin started his third presidential term after large-scale           
protests in Moscow ‘For fair elections’, the model has changed and, in my             
view, merged with Oates’s neo-Soviet media system model. While the          
political situation required increased control over the media, the content, in           
contrast to Becker’s neo-authoritarian model, did not consist of         
de-politicized entertainment: quite the reverse. Indeed, after 2012,        
state-controlled broadcasters have significantly increased airtime devoted to        
political and ideological issues (Tolz and Teper, 2018). 
At the same time, television remains the dominant and most pervasive           




Board of Governors, 2014). In 2014, when the Ukraine crisis was unfolding,            
around 90% of people in Russia cited television as their main source of             
information (Levada Center, 2014a), and most (59%) were more likely to           
trust their source of information (Levada Center, 2016). Although the          
television audience decreased to 72% by 2019, the state-aligned channels          
(particularly Channel One, Rossia-1 and NTV, all three channels have a           
nationwide outreach) remain the most popular news source for Russians          
with nearly a half of the Russian population regularly watching news           
programs of those channels on TV or online (Statista, 2019). These channels            
also enjoy a relatively high level of trust, at around 55%, and play a key role                
in articulating the official discourse (Levada Center, 2019a; Tolz and Teper,           
2018). 
Notably, this high level of popularity and trust, along with          
consumption of highly political and ideological content, is also well captured           
by the neo-Soviet model of the media system. In the Soviet Union, the news              
was not meant to inform but to ‘lead’ the population (Ognyanova, 2010). As             
Oates (2007) describes it, ‘the media sent a clear, unambiguous message           
about Soviet values, giving the audience a sense of contentment and pride in             
their society’ (pp. 1295–1296). Although the contemporary Russian media         
landscape is more diverse and offers a wider range of media outlets, Oates             
(2007: p. 1296) reports that the audience still values the fundamental role of             
the media as an institution that guides rather than informs and does not             
question or undermine the nation. Following the Soviet tradition, people use           
the media to make sense of domestic and foreign events, thus expecting it to              
determine and signal what is good and what is bad. This could explain why              
Russians consistently choose Channel One or other state-run television         
channels as their favourite source of information. It could also explain why            
people trust that state-run television covers the events in Ukraine truthfully           
and without bias (Levada Center, 2015a; WCIOM, 2014 ​1​). 
2.3. T​AKING​ ​INFORMATION ​ ​WARFARE ​ ​ONLINE ​: ​GOVERNMENT​’​S​ ​CONTROL 
AND ​ ​SURVEILLANCE​ ​TOOLBOX 
The internet has turned modern information warfare into a global          
multimedia forum where rival voices struggle to be heard (Cottle, 2006),           
making it increasingly difficult to impose hegemonic narratives or framings          
on a conflict (Darczewska, 2014; Hoskins and O’Loughlin, 2015; Jack, 2017;           
Kaempf, 2013; Kalinina, 2016; Miskimmon et al., 2014; Oates, 2014;          
Pomerantsev, 2019; see also Antoniades et al., 2010; Papacharissi, 2012).          
However, while the Russian internet continues searching the opportunities to          
1 ​It is interesting to note that Levada Center is a non-governmental research organization, which has 
been formed by the professionals previously employed by WCIOM, after WCIOM has been 
transformed into an open joint-stock company with full state ownership in 2003. 
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grow as a platform where pluralistic opinions can co-exist and be freely            
exchanged (Bolin et al., 2016; Wijermars and Lehtisaari, 2019), the Russian           
government tries to adapt to the modern networked communication         
environment through a set of new law regulations and control techniques           
(Van der Vet, 2019). Ognyanova (2010) suggests that this is the established            
information politics in Russia that has allowed the state administration to           
extend its traditional manipulation strategies to encompass the internet.  
The situation was exacerbated with the Arab Spring (2010–2012)         
when several authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and North Africa           
collapsed. Social media may not have caused revolutions, but it did           
contribute to the growth of protests across the region, as information flowed            
from Tunisia to other Arab states (Hall, 2019; Wolfsfeld et al., 2013). The             
internet has been credited with opening new venues for civic debate like            
blogs and social networks that are significantly different from what is offered            
by traditional mainstream media (Etling et al., 2014; Kelly et al., 2012). For             
example, it has been reported that on Twitter any (dis)information from           
governments, militaries or other official sources is rapidly met with          
counter-narratives (e.g., Zeitzoff, 2014). In addition, in Russia, digital         
communication technologies enabled contestation and mobilization of       
people after allegedly fraudulent parliamentary elections in December 2011         
(Oates, 2013), which resulted in the large-scale protests in Moscow, and also            
in the ‘internet elections’, an absolutely new digital tactic of public’s collective            
action (Toepfl, 2018). 
In reply, the Russian government has tried to block the internet with            
elaborate control measures. Thus, in 2012 Russia introduced a centralized          
internet blacklist known as the ‘single register’ and maintained it by the            
Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology        
and Mass Media (Roskomnadzor). The list is used for the censorship of            
individual URLs, domain names and IP addresses and for removing allegedly           
illegal content or blocking abusive websites without the need for judicial           
approval. Originally, it was introduced to ban sites calling for drug abuse and             
drug production, describing methods of suicide and containing child         
pornography. In 2013, the rules were amended to allow the blocking of            
websites that contained materials classified as extremist. 
The vague definitions of ‘extremist’ activities allowed for flexible         
interpretations and provided Roskomnadzor with more opportunities to        
block inconvenient websites. According to Freedom House, these regulations         
have frequently been abused to censor criticism of the federal government or            
local administrations (Freedom on the Net, 2016). Thus, for example, on 13            
March 2014 (three days before the referendum in Crimea), the Prosecutor           
General issued an order to block access to three major opposition websites:            
Grani.ru, Ezhednevny Zhurnal (Ej.ru) and Kasparov.ru. The websites’ owners         




the law and thus caused the Prosecutor General to issue the blocking order.             
Their lawsuits have so far brought no positive results (European Audiovisual           
Observatory, 2015). 
At the same time, to legitimize the government’s policies aimed at           
controlling and censoring the internet, the traditional media have generally          
framed the internet as a threat to the public by employing metaphors of fear              
(Ognyanova, 2010; Schmidt et al., 2006; Bodrunova and Litvinenko, 2016).          
Putin also referred to the internet in the context of conspiracy theories,            
calling for resistance to the CIA’s influence and the protection of Russia’s            
online interests (MacAskill, 2014). Schmidt et al. (2006) report that          
promoting fear and distrust appears to be an intentional strategy to win            
public support for the government’s decisions to censor online content. As a            
result, over 80% of Russians have negative attitudes about the online           
availability of politically controversial content (Nisbet, 2015).  
Despite the increasing regulation of social and online media and          
framing cyberspace as an unsafe arena of communication, the internet          
continues attracting more users and becomes a strong competitor to the           
traditional mass media in terms of time users spend online and advertising            
revenue (Vartanova, 2019: p. 29). Vartanova (2019) emphasizes that it has           
stimulated, though, the digital transformation of the traditional media and,          
thus, paradoxically, increased the consumption of television products        
through interactive digital platforms and the growth of non-linear television          
watching on desktops, laptops and telephone screens (p. 30). Consequently,          
most of the state-aligned television channels, including Channel One, do not           
only constitute the first multiplex (mandatory access and free on-air          
channels available to 98,4% of Russian population) (rtrs.ru, n.d.) but also           
interact with the audience online. This digital character of contemporary          
Russian television reconfigures it as a hybrid system, which from one side,            
provides new opportunities for top-down strategic narrative efforts, and from          
the other side, due to transnational format of the internet, nurtures critical            
attention and accusations of propaganda coming from abroad. 
The battle to control public opinion online is not limited to the            
empowerment of the state-run media with the digital features and additional           
law regulations of cyberspace. A phenomenon known as Russian/Kremlin         
troll farms has been recognized as a Russian online information warfare           
tactic. Some scholars identify it as borrowed from Soviet propaganda          
techniques like reflexive control, ‘maskirovka’ or deception and adapted to          
networked online media (Jaitner, 2015; Sienkiewicz, 2016; Suslov, 2016). In          
practice, public awareness of troll use in political contexts was heightened           
when the Ukraine crisis broke out and references to state-sponsored deviant           
behaviours online against political opposition in authoritarian regimes in         
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Sienkiewicz (2016) reports that these government-paid web users        
populate internet resources and social media with Kremlin-supported        
messages and harass unfriendly journalists and opponents on a regular basis.           
It is believed that, in order to confuse the global networked discourse, Russia             
expends tremendous resources in support of troll farms; just one of the many             
troll offices in Russia employs roughly 400 people and costs nearly $5            
million a year in salaries alone (Sienkiewicz, 2016: p. 21).  
Suslov (2016) notes that the trolls’ messages are often merely an           
exchange of symbolic markers or ‘reminders’ of hatred (p. 62). This means            
that, with the help of symbol-laden metaphors and rhetoric of fear (‘fascists’,            
‘lybirasts’, etc.), trolling commentators appeal to emotion rather than reason.          
Suslov (2016) suggests that contemporary cyberwars represent the stage on          
which online polemics concentrate largely on promoting negative        
mobilization and the humiliation of critical users. 
Along with the development of the crisis in Ukraine, state regulation           
and censorship of the internet in Russia was becoming more intense. In            
2014, the Russian government enacted the so-called ‘blogger law’ (Russian          
Federation, 2014), which forced owners of open-access websites and web          
pages (labelled ‘bloggers’) visited by more than 3000 users a day to register             
with the public authorities. It also imposed additional responsibility on them           
to verify the accuracy and reliability of posted information, follow election           
laws, respect reputations and privacy, refrain from using curse words and           
obey other conditions (European Audiovisual Observatory, 2015). A website         
could be registered voluntarily or upon request from Roskomnadzor. The          
registered organizers of information dissemination were obliged to store         
visitor data for six months. This included metadata about correspondence          
but did not require the contents of such communications (Russian          
Federation, 2014). 
In 2016, an updated version of the Russian Federation Doctrine of           
Information Security came into force, replacing a document approved in          
2000 (Russian Federation Doctrine of Information Security, 2000) and         
adding a number of strategic provisions. One key difference between the two            
documents is that the 2016 rules introduced the internet as a central concept             
and called on the government to develop ‘a national system of managing the             
Russian segment of the internet’ (Russian Federation Doctrine of         
Information Security, 2016). The consolidation of management and        
centralization of information resources were declared to be major priorities          
for information security. 
Another major difference is that, while the 2000 doctrine prioritizes          
individual interests, the new vision is completely focused on national          
interests in the field of information (Sharikov, 2016). In addition, while the            
previous document made a distinction between external and internal threats          




differentiation. Fridman (2018) argues that this merger of the individual and           
the national and external and internal threats in the 2016 doctrine           
emphasizes the causal connection, in the Kremlin’s view, between external          
influences and internal destabilization of the state and provides more          
favourable conditions for the government to conduct information warfare         
both inside the country and beyond Russia’s borders (p. 146). 
In 2016, the Russian government also approved legal amendments         
known as the ‘Yarovaya package’ or ‘Yarovaya law’. This refers to a set of two               
federal bills, 374-FZ (Russian Federation, 2016a) and 375-FZ (Russian         
Federation, 2016b), that strengthen the conditions for the state’s struggle          
against terrorism and extremism. According to the law, communications         
providers and internet operators are obliged to store metadata about their           
users’ communications activities, to disclose decryption keys upon request by          
the security services and to use only encryption methods approved by the            
Russian government. Article 19 (2018) argues that, in practical terms, these           
amendments create a backdoor for Russia’s security agents to access internet           
users’ data, traffic patterns and communications (pp. 52–53). 
Thus, in October 2017, the messaging service Telegram was found          
guilty under the Yarovaya Law of failing to provide decryption keys to the             
Russian authorities. Pavel Durov, who created the application, has been a           
constant and vociferous critic of the Russian government. When the          
Yarovaya package was adopted, Durov proclaimed that the law undermined          
the right to secrecy of correspondence and that compliance not only           
contradicted the application’s policies but was also technically impossible         
(BBC News Russkaya sluzhba, 2018). For these reasons, his company refused           
to cooperate with the authorities. The company was fined 800,000 rubles           
(approximately 11,000 EUR). Telegram lost an appeal of the administrative          
charge in March 2018, giving the Russian authorities formal grounds to block            
Telegram in Russia. Under these circumstances, Telegram officially became         
an inconvenient actor and, more importantly, a target for pressure. 
Finally, on 1 May 2019, President Putin signed the ‘sovereign internet           
law’, which went into effect on 1 November 2019 (Russian Federation, 2019).            
The law significantly enhances the Kremlin’s control over the internet. It           
allows Russia’s government to cut off the internet completely or block traffic            
from outside Russia during an emergency caused by a foreign threat like a             
cyberattack, as the BBC reported (BBC News, 2019). The law allows the            
Russian government to tighten control over the country’s internet by routing           
web traffic through state-controlled infrastructure and creating a national         
system of domain names (CNBC, 2019); in its report, CNBC calls it an ‘online              
Iron Curtain’.  
Indeed, in the new global media ecology, Russia’s strategic narratives          
are fragile, as they are constantly challenged by alternative domestic          
(internet) information sources, international news and other transnational        
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actors (Oates, 2014). The Russian government, as other non-democratic         
regimes, is, yet, unable to extensively control the internet primarily due to            
the challenges of technical execution and the internet’s global connectivity          
feature (Wijermars and Lehtisaari, 2019). Consequently, the internet in         
Russia continues nurturing a general digital suspicion (Andrejevic, 2013;         
Kuntsman and Stein, 2011) that tends to increase in the contexts of political             
crises and wars. However, at the same time, the federal and mainstream            
television remains influential as a source of information and as an           
instrument of articulating strategic narratives  (Hoskins and Shchelin, 2018).   
2.4. U​NDERSTANDING​ R ​USSIA ​’​S​ ​INVOLVEMENT​ ​IN ​ ​THE ​ U ​KRAINE​ ​CRISIS 
AND ​ ​THE ​ S ​YRIAN ​ ​WAR  
Despite accusations, the Russian government continues to deny any direct          
involvement in the conflict in Ukraine (Public Radio International, 2019;          
Welt, 2020). In Syria, by contrast, Russia emphasizes its official position of            
engagement. Although the legal, officially declared engagement of Russia in          
these two conflicts is vastly different, both conflicts have been accompanied           
by remarkable media campaigns in Russia and internationally. A major          
milestone in the information warfare arose in 2013–2014, during the          
Ukraine crisis; the Russian government proved to be quite efficient in           
mobilizing the population, increasing patriotism and boosting Putin’s        
popularity (Levada Center, 2015b, 2019b). When Russia announced its         
intervention to Syria in 2015, it continued using similar strategies of           
information warfare based on strategic narratives with references to history          
and national identity to gain public support for the new military operation.  
2.4.1. A​RMED​ ​CONFLICT​ ​IN​ U ​KRAINE​: ​A​ ​BRIEF​ ​SUMMARY 
The military conflict in Ukraine followed the Euromaidan protests and          
incorporation of Crimea into Russia without the Ukrainian authorities’         
consent. The Russian government, and President Vladimir Putin in         
particular, appealed to the historical and geopolitical imaginations of         
Russians related to Crimea and extensively used the Euromaidan protests as           
an argument to justify the deployment of the unmarked troops ‘to protect’            
Russian-speaking Crimeans and to support the referendum of the peninsula's          
population (Biersack and O’Lear, 2014). Despite the legal rhetoric ​2 and          
strong historical claims to Crimea, the referendum fulfilled the criteria of           
neither legality nor legitimacy breaching Ukraine’s domestic, bilateral        
2 ​Legal rhetoric was based on the right of the Crimean people to self-determination in the form of 
secession appealing to Art. 5 of the Russian Constitution which contains a provision for the right of 





(Ukraine-Russia) and international legal frameworks (Bebler, 2015; Lamont,        
2014; Podolian, 2014; Vidmar, 2015). 
The crisis escalated further in April and May 2014, when two           
Ukrainian regions proclaimed their independence from Kyiv and formed         
so-called people’s republics: the ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ (DPR) and the          
‘Luhansk People’s Republic’ (LPR). A military confrontation between the         
regions’ new ‘authorities’ and the Ukrainian government was framed         
differently by the involved parties. The Ukrainian mainstream media         
characterized separatists in Eastern regions as terrorists backed by the          
Russian military units’ munitions and forces and, consequently, the         
Ukrainian government’s military actions against them as the anti-terrorist         
operation (ATO) (Katchanovski, 2016). The Russian mainstream media        
denied any involvement and framed separatists as rebels (in the defensive           
and sympathetic connotations) and the conflict as a civil war between the            
Russian-speaking or pro-Russian Ukrainian population and ​khunta “junta”        
used as a standard term for the Kyiv government and its ​karateli            
(expeditionary forces, pacifiers or lit. punishers) when referring to the          
government military forces (Horbyk, 2015; Pettersson and Wallensteen,        
2015). 
The conflict rapidly intensified and by the end of 2014, rough           
estimates indicated that more than four thousand people had been killed and            
approximately half a million had been displaced because of the conflict           
(SIPRI Yearbook, 2015). The conflict also led to a significant humanitarian           
crisis in Eastern regions and to the events such as the downing of the MH17               
airliner with 298 civilian deaths, while it was flying over the Donbas area on              
17 July 2014 (OHCHR, 2019). The military operations by both sides still            
continue. Internationally, the Ukraine crisis has provoked a conflict between          
Ukraine and Russia, and the sharpest deterioration in relations between          
Russia and the West since the early 1980s (Charap and Shapiro, 2015). 
2.4.2. S​YRIAN​ ​CIVIL​ ​WAR​: ​A​ ​BRIEF​ ​SUMMARY 
The Syrian civil war grew out of political protests in early 2011. The protests              
were inspired by successful uprisings during the Arab Spring that toppled           
presidents in Tunisia and Egypt. Bashar al-Assad’s government met the          
initially peaceful demonstrations with increasing repression and force. The         
government’s military responses, which claimed hundreds of civilian lives,         
led to increased clashes between opposition groups and state authorities and,           
ultimately, a full-fledged civil war. The Syrian opposition consisted of secular           
and Islamist armed groups, including a variety of jihadist groups, such as the             
competing Al Nusra Front and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)             
(Anzalone, 2016). The expansionism of ISIS further contributed to the          
escalation of the conflict (Dal, 2016). In June 2014, after consolidating its            
hold over several cities in Iraq and Syria, the group declared the            
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establishment of a caliphate and changed its name to the Islamic State            
(Hassan, 2018).  
The rise of the ISIS threat created security and political challenges in            
many countries and motivated the international community to intervene in          
the civil war. In September 2014, the US-led Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS             
was formed. While the use of force by the coalition was officially requested             
and welcomed by the Iraq government, the Syrian government characterised          
the coalition’s operations as a violation of its sovereignty (Gill, 2016: pp.            
361–362). The US and its allies, in return, blamed the al-Assad regime for             
beginning the civil war and increasing the number of civilian casualties. The            
Coalition supported Syrian rebels identified by the US as a moderate           
opposition (Casula, 2015).  
Russia started its military campaign in Syria in September 2015 in           
response to a formal request by al-Assad’s government for help against           
anti-government groups. Russia has justified its foray into Syria as an effort            
to fight global terrorism and defeat ISIS, but Russia’s strategic objectives           
included keeping its long-time ally in power and securing continued access to            
the Tartus naval base. Meanwhile, Putin defined Russia’s goal in Syria as            
‘stabilising the legitimate power in Syria and creating the conditions for           
political compromise’ (Interfax, 2015). Its military and diplomatic        
intervention ensured Russia’s important role in conflict resolution processes         
(Casula, 2015). Russia has used media coverage to showcase its re-emergence           




3. T​HEORETICAL​ ​FRAMEWORK​: ​STRATEGIC​ ​NARRATIVE 
In everyday life, ‘human beings think, perceive and make moral choices           
according to narrative structures’ (Sarbin, 1986: p. 8). At the most basic level,             
narratives bring together actors, actions, goals, reasons and references upon          
which humans symbolically make sense of the world (Boje, 1991: p. 106; see             
also Burke, 1969). Harold Rosen (1986) argues that narratives make it           
possible to infuse coherence into chaotic flows of information by guiding the            
processes of reasoning and understanding. ​Narrative is thus a mode of           
attributing meanings to events​, and collective narratives establish        
shared meanings of events (Boyce, 1995; Taylor et al., 2002). A shared            
understanding of the world helps individuals interpret their actions and the           
actions of others in terms of currently accepted responsibilities, values, moral           
norms and social contexts. Collective narratives are especially important         
when events are complex, ambiguous and difficult to interpret using solely           
logical and factual methods (Soulier and Caussanel, 2002), as occurs in a            
political crisis or a war.  
Freedman (2006), who has developed much research into strategic         
narratives, argues that ​narratives become strategic when there is an          
intention to influence perceptions. For that, strategic narratives make         
use of ideas and feelings that are already current in society (p. 22). Therefore,              
strategic narratives are difficult to recognize as an attempt of persuasion but            
are more tapping into ‘ideas that are common sense in a particular culture’             
(Colley, 2019: p. 47) or ‘a part of the natural and generally benign order of               
things’ (Freedman, 2013: p. 615). In this understanding, the concept of           
strategic narratives overlaps with the concept of discourse.  
Discourse is a set of meanings and practices constructed according to           
the rules about what is accepted in society as norms, knowledge and values             
(Foucault, 1972). Discourse can be described as the currently existing state of            
affairs or a fixed frame of references that create an understanding of the roles              
of actors and their relationships. What the concept of discourse ​cannot ​​           
explain, however, is the causal transformation that takes actors or their           
relationships from one status quo to another, as strategic narratives do           
(Miskimmon et al., 2013: p. 7). Thus, discourse impacts the content of            
strategic narratives but cannot replace them, as it lacks the necessary causal            
and temporal features to do so. Hence, conceptually, ​a strategic narrative           
represents a communicative tool that political elites intentionally        
deploy in their attempts to construct a shared meaning of the           
origins, current state and future outcomes of political processes         
so as to influence the behaviour of domestic and international          




Although strategic narratives usually originate from political elites,        
they are advanced and disseminated by mass media outlets (Hinck et al.,            
2019: p. 5). Mainstream media, therefore, comes to the fore as an actor that              
filters out and voices only particular narratives or as a conduit that transfers             
the narratives from a source to the audience (Arsenault et al., 2017: p. 204              
cited in Hinck et al., 2019: p. 5). Political (and other) elites use strategic              
narratives in mass media, to achieve a variety of communicative goals, such            
as agenda setting, legitimation, diverting attention, securing acquiescence,        
enhancing popularity, mobilization and facilitation of policymaking (Barry        
and Elmes, 1997; Freedman, 2006: pp. 23–24; Mattern Bially, 2005: pp. 13,            
107; Miskimmon et al., 2012, 2013: p. 8). ​The powerful strategic narratives            
around the events of 9/11 designed by the Bush administration are a striking             
example of legitimation: they justified the invasion of Iraq as a patriotic duty,             
labelled dissenting voices ‘anti-American’ and stigmatized certain migrant        
communities as perpetual suspects (Andrews, 2007). In the context of the           
Yugoslav wars, narratives created by political and religious elites provided an           
imp ​ortant incentive for nationalists’ mobilization and subsequent intense        
violence (Baker, 2006; Smith, 1997; Vujačić and Gagnon, 2007).  
Studying strategic narratives in the news, however, means exploring         
the mechanisms employed by the news media or individual journalists to           
frame events in a certain way to facilitate the mobilization and support of the              
public. The concepts of ​framing and ​strategic narratives share the same           
function of attributing meaning. In media studies, Gamson and Modigliani          
(1989) understand ​frames as ‘interpretative packages’ that attach meanings         
to issues or events. Moreover, Goffman (1974) has noted that the meaning of             
a frame has implicit cultural roots. This dependence on the cultural contexts            
of a society establishes another similarity between framing and strategic          
narrative concepts. In mass communication research, it has been described          
as ‘cultural resonance’ (Gamson and Modigliani, 1987) and ‘cultural         
congruence’ (Entman, 2009). The more frames employ culturally resonant         
references, the more potential they have in terms of cognition, emotional           
appeal and, as a result, influence (Entman, 2009).  
However, ​frames ​, same as ​discourse ​, do not typically introduce an          
explanation of causal and temporal transformation; they do not explain the           
reasons for and outcomes of an event (Miskimmon et al., 2013). ​Frames give             
prominence to certain facets of an event or issue to promote a particular             
interpretation, evaluation or solution (Bougana and Segev, 2017; Entman,         
2009, Norris et al., 2003; Tankard, 2001). ​Therefore, strategic narratives          
often represent a series of particular framings. ​Miskimmon et al. (2013)           
argue that understanding strategic narratives enables the comprehension of         
why and how framing actually works. In other words, a strategic narrative            
puts the story first, connecting specifically framed actors, circumstances,         




Thus, a strategic narrative is defined in this dissertation ​as a set of             
media frames undertaken to reinforce, subvert, undermine,       
overwhelm or replace a pre-existing discourse on a subject         
significant to both the audience and the ‘speaker’ that is often a            
political elite (Price, 2014). This thesis draws on the strategic narrative           
framework based on two theoretical arguments. First, the concept allows for           
piecing together and analysing the dynamic flows of information during          
political and military conflicts. ​Second, the concept of strategic narrative can           
provide a more nuanced understanding of how media narratives may shape           
opinions and create support for decisions related to political and military           
conflicts. 
This chapter examines the nature of strategic narratives and what          
makes them different from soft power and propaganda (section 3.1). It also            
addresses previous research dealing specifically with how and why strategic          
narratives are built around conflicts and wars (section 3.2). The chapter           
develops further by describing how strategic relatives are advanced through          
such a journalistic genre as television news (section 3.3). Then the power of             
visuals in strategic narratives is discussed (section 3.4). Finally, the chapter           
specifies the narratives that are promoted through the Russian television          
news with regard to the Ukraine crisis and the war in Syria (section 3.5). 
3.1. D​EFINING​ ​A ​ ​STRATEGIC ​ ​NARRATIVE​ ​CONCEPT​ ​BY​ ​DISTINGUISHING​ ​IT 
FROM ​ ​THE ​ ​CONCEPTS​ ​OF​ ​SOFT​ ​POWER ​ ​AND ​ ​PROPAGANDA 
While the term ‘strategic narrative’ is relatively new, there is a long history of              
scholars addressing the importance of communication as a means of shaping           
others’ perceptions and sentiments. Closely related terms include ​soft         
power ​and ​propaganda​. Below, I contribute to the understanding of the           
differences and similarities between these concepts. 
3.1.1. S​OFT​ ​POWER 
The concept of soft power is frequently used in international affairs to            
explain the power balance between countries achieved through other means          
rather than the use of military or economic might. Joseph Nye, who            
introduced the concept, calls it ‘the ability to attract’ (2004: p. 6) or, in terms               
of resources, a combination of assets that a country uses to produce such             
attraction (2008: p. 95). These assets include a country’s culture, political           
values and foreign policy. When a country succeeds in presenting its policies            
and political values so that they appear attractive and legitimate to others,            
that country’s soft power is enhanced, which gives it a better chance to             




without using the threat of force or coercive economic measures (Rothman,           
2011: p. 50).  
Policies and political values become attractive and legitimate only         
when they are aligned with the cultural, historical and political contexts in            
which they are presented; thus, soft power assets become meaningful only           
when they are contextualized within the shared understandings of social          
relations (Feklyunina, 2016). Soft power constitutes a relational        
phenomenon that depends on the context. ​Roselle et al. (2014) apply this            
approach to soft power within the conceptual category of strategic narratives,           
arguing that a strategic narrative ​is soft power but provides a better way to              
examine ‘what means and methods of persuasion and influence are likely to            
work under what conditions’ (p. 71). Thus, instead of taking a ‘resource’ or an              
‘asset’ as an analytical category, I use the concept of strategic narrative            
to explore ​how and ​what resources have been used to advance a            
specific interpretation of events through mass media (television)        
and align it with the expectations and values of the intended           
audience(s).  
Some scholars believe that authoritarian countries like Russia often         
use information and rhetoric as a means of wielding soft power (Borchers,            
2011; Jowett and O’Donnell, 2012; Yablokov, 2015). Nye’s famous expression          
about ‘whose story wins’ (2014: p. 21) is used to describe international            
conflicts in the information age, in which the successful side is the country             
that presents the most convincing and legitimate interpretation of events          
(Pomerantsev, 2015; Szostek, 2014). Thus, ‘harder’ soft power assets include          
manipulation of information and propaganda (Rothman, 2011: p. 50). 
3.1.2. P​ROPAGANDA 
The concept of ​propaganda ​is typically understood in communication         
studies as a persuasive instrument to move audiences with a pre-established           
intent to bolster the interest and values of a sender (Arthos, 2013). In the              
Soviet tradition, as discussed above, propaganda carried a positive         
connotation of political education. Despite criticism, this approach still         
dominates the political thinking of contemporary Russian elites. For         
instance, Dmitry Tulchinskly, the Berlin bureau chief of the Ru ​ssian news           
agency Rossiya Segodnya, has defined propaganda as ‘the tendentious         
presentation of facts... It does not mean lying’ (Troianovski, 2014, cited in            
Boyte, 2017).  
In the Western understanding, however, propaganda is usually        
regarded as equivalent to ma​nipulation, fallacy, concealment, emotional        
exploitation or behavioural modification (Jowett and O’Donnell, 2012;        
Sproule, 1994; Taithe and Thorton, 2000). Alex P. Schmid (2014) argues that            
democratic governments thus avoid using the term ‘propaganda’ for their          




behaviours of specific audiences. Instead, they prefer terms like ‘public          
affairs’, ‘public diplomacy’, ‘psychological operations’ and ‘strategic       
communications​3​’ (Schmid, 2014, p. 1).  
The concept of strategic narratives, however, differs from propaganda.         
Dimitriu and De Graaf (2016) hold that strategic narratives are a more            
nuanced instrument of persuasion as it relates to the national culture of            
norms and attitudes regarding war and peace. As Corman (2011) has           
emphasized, ‘[n]arratives are powerful resources for influencing target        
audiences... as they offer an alternative form of rationality deeply rooted in            
culture, which can be used to interpret and frame local events and to             
strategically encourage particular kinds of personal action’ (p. 42). From this           
perspec ​tive, strategic narrative is a construct defined by both the subject of            
influence and the context.  
Miskimmon et al. (2013) emphasize that narratives may be created          
strategically, but not any narrative can be produced at any time. Propaganda,            
by contras​t, is normally determined by the intention of its source. It            
represents a strictly top-down flow of deliberately devised messages from the           
source to masses of people with the purpose of generating actions that            
benefit the source (Parry-Giles, 2002: p. xvii). A distinguishing characteristic          
of strategic narratives is their ‘resonating’ with target audiences, as they are            
initially designed as ​culturally attuned constructions (Colley, 2019: p.         
47; see also Hinck et al., 2018; Riessman, 2008). However, the existing            
literature does not contribute much in the understanding of how strategic           
narratives are attuned when they are promoted for the international          
audience. This dissertation made an attempt to fill this gap by exploring how             
Russia’s RT tailored the strategic narratives related to the Ukraine crisis for            
the international public. 
3.2. C​ONFLICTS ​ ​AND ​ ​STRATEGIC ​ ​NARRATIVES 
The power of actors in contemporary conflicts depends to a great extent on             
public support, both at home and within the area of operations. De Graaf et              
al. (2015: p. 5) state that ‘success in war is nearly always a matter of               
convincing one or more audiences of a particular understanding of reality’.           
Therefore, perhaps, it was no coincidence that scholars have started to talk            
about a ‘narrative turn’ in international relations and media studies (see           
Levinger and Roselle, 2017: p. 94 and De Fina and Georgakopoulou, 2019:            
pp. 21–27) and pay considerable attention to strategic narratives as an           
3 ​Although the terms ‘strategic narrative’ and ‘strategic communication’ might sound confusingly 
similar, they are different in their definition. Strategic communication represents the whole spectrum 
of various communication activities purposefully designed to engage the public in a conversation and 
help an entity survive and achieve sustained success. An entity includes all kinds of organizations (e.g., 
corporations, governments, or nonprofits, social movements and known individuals in the public 





instrument of persuasion of domestic and international audiences        
(Freedman, 2015; Goddard and Krebs, 2015; Krebs, 2015; Miskimmon et al.,           
2017; Senn, 2017; Snyder, 2015), especially during the contemporary wars          
and conflicts (Colley, 2019; de Franco, 2012; Hutchings and Szostek, 2015;           
Lucas and Pomeranzev, 2016; Nissen, 2013; Simpson, 2012) and when          
justifying the military engagement abroad (Berinski, 2007; de Graaf et al.,           
2015; Dimitriu and de Graaf, 2016; Ringsmose and Børgesen, 2011).  
This research is based on the premise that strategic narratives are           
powerful instruments used to support the legitimacy and credibility of a           
conflict. I use a definition of a conflict in a political sense: ‘a state of hostility                
between groups of people, usually belonging to different races, religions or           
nation states’ (Baker, 2006: p. 1). Normally, legitimacy during conflicts is           
constructed ​at three levels of strategic narratives ​: issue narratives, identity          
narratives and international system narratives (Miskimmon and O’Loughlin,        
2017; Roselle et al., 2014).  
First, in a time of conflict, ongoing events often require a specific            
response or a policy from political actors. In this case, ‘issue narratives’ (also             
called ‘policy narratives’) are constructed and advanced around the issues.          
Issue narratives are deployed to place the government’s decisions in a           
context that explains who the important actors are, what the conflict or issue             
is and how a particular course of actions will resolve the underlying issue             
(Roselle et al., 2014: p. 76; see also Miskimmon and O’Loughlin, 2017;            
Vlahos, 2009). 
Second, the narrative of identity (national narrative) is crucial when a           
conflict relates to international affairs and thereby reshapes attitudes to          
‘Others’ involved in the conflict. Identity narratives encompass people’s         
perceptions about themselves as a unique collective consciousness,        
distinguished by territory, common values and culture (Gutiérrez, 2001).         
These narratives make meaning out of a nation’s history in accordance with            
the nation’s goals and perceptions of its own uniqueness (Miskimmon and           
O’Loughlin, 2017; Miskimmon et al., 2013). The perceptions of who we are            
and what makes us unique are constructed by defining who the ‘Others’ are             
and the ways in which we resemble or differ from them (Siddi, 2018). Wars              
and conflicts reveal existing beliefs related to identity affiliations, which are           
usually packed with nationalistic feelings like pride and patriotism and          
aimed to distinguish ‘us’ from ‘them’ (Cottle, 2006: p. 77) and create the             
moral justifications for violence against them (De Graaf et al., 2015; Dimitriu            
and de Graaf, 2016; Freedman, 2006; Ringsmose and Børgesen, 2011;          
Roselle, 2010; Vujačić and Gagnon, 2007). 
Third, international system narratives are used by political actors to          
explain the structure of the world beyond their states’ borders and to affect             
the behaviour of other international actors (Levinger and Roselle, 2017;          




particularly true in periods of transition in the international system when           
hegemonic powers are facing changes in the status quo (Antoniades et al.,            
2010). The end of the Cold War, for example, brought about profound            
changes in international relations. Since then, Russia has been striving to           
restore its image as a global superpower and constructing its strategic           
narratives accordingly. Levinger and Roselle (2017) argue that beginning         
with his first presidential term in 2000, Putin has consistently attempted to            
counteract the Western unipolar system narrative that depicts the US as the            
only remaining global superpower with the narrative of a ‘polycentric world’           
in which Russia remains a great power. Levinger and Roselle (2017: p. 95)             
conclude that the core of Russia’s strategic narrative related to international           
relations is its self-image as a ‘centre of influence in today’s world’. 
All three levels of strategic narratives – issue, identity and          
international system – are interconnected. Roselle et al. (2014: p. 77) hold            
that strategic narratives promoted at one level impact narratives at other           
levels and, in combination, constrain policy choices and behaviour. Often,          
the same narratives configure perceptions of events, belonging and identity          
and shape the relationships between individuals and nations. From this          
perspective, it is appropriate to mention that efforts aimed at persuasion are            
not limited to political leaders’ statements; public approval of military          
actions is usually earned through mass channels of information. The media           
are thus crucial in the construction or denial of legitimacy during crises or             
conflicts.  
3.3. S​TRATEGIC ​ ​NARRATIVES​ ​IN ​ ​NEWS 
Ideally, journalistic practices are defined by the established norms of          
objectivity and professional ethics. However, the authoritarian regimes        
create an environment where media outlets are tightly controlled and          
journalists’ reporting is constrained with the government’s strategic narrative         
framework. Russia, as it is discussed above, represents this kind of political            
regime. Nevertheless, to see journalists as nothing but ​the government’s          
instruments for advancing the strategic narratives would mean to         
oversimplify the situation and omit the human personality and own choices           
of journalists and editors. 
The scholars point that during national crises or military         
confrontations, journalists often choose to act according to their national,          
ethnic, or civil identity even if it comes at the expense of their professional              
valu ​es (Bennett and Paletz, 1994; Hallin, 1986; Liebes, 1997; ​Liebes and           
Kampf, 2009; Wolfsfeld et al., 2008; Zandberg and Neiger, 2005; Zelizer and            
Allan, 2002). This phenomenon, termed ‘patriotic journalism’, is        
well-documented all over the world and does not depend on political regimes            




no one commonly accepted definition of patriotic journalism, it is often           
described as the ‘loyalty of a journalist, or a journalistic institution, to its             
nation, country, or ethnic group’ explicitly expressed during military conflicts          
or terror attacks (Ginosar, 2015:p. 290). 
Liebes (1992) defines patriotic journalism as coverage of ‘our war’ as           
opposed to coverage of “their war” when a journalist is not emotionally,            
culturally or ethnically attached to the conflict parties and tends to cover the             
conflict events and involved actors neutrally and objectively. Wolfsfeld et al.           
(2008) distinguish ​‘victims mode’ and ‘defensive mode’ of patriotic         
journalism. The victims mode prevails when journalists belong to the          
suffering or abused party and their reports aim to mobilize the public against             
an enemy. The most salient features of the victims mode are emotional            
intensity, personalization of victims and cultural contextualization based on         
journalistic techniques that employ ethnic solidarity and demonization of the          
enemy (Wolfsfeld et al., 2008: p. 404). The defensive mode is observed when             
it is essential to support the deployment of a state’s military forces abroad             
and to justify civilian losses on the enemy’s side. The distinctive features of             
the defensive mode are extensive use of technical or military terminology and            
an analytical approach to the ongoing events with the focus on numbers and             
statistics instead of personal stories, and graphics - especially maps to           
reinforce the sense of distance. Both the victims and defensive modes,           
Wolfsfeld et al. (2008) believe, ​are neither consciously formulated nor          
intentionally used by journalists.  
There are two preconditions that stimulate patriotic journalism as a          
model of behaviour among reporters and editors. First, this is a public            
consensus about a particular issue or a historical event, which is not            
supposed to be disputed or negotiated (Hallin, 1986), for example, the public            
consensus in Russia about World War II memories. Second, this is a            
dominant strategic narrative which the government advances without        
offering an alternative or opposite framing of the events (Ginosar and Cohen,            
2019: p. 7). Ginosar and Cohen (2019) argue that when the majority of the              
population agrees with the government’s framing of the events, or when the            
government purposefully utilizes the commonly accepted public views, social         
norms or historical memories, the public consensus merges the government’s          
strategic narrative. Indeed, in non-democratic political systems there tend to          
be more mechanisms to exploit public consensus and orchestrate the content           
of state-run news outlets. At the same time, the phenomenon of patriotic            
journalism contributes to a better understanding of why journalists (are          
willing to) adjust or modify their professional routines in accordance with           




3.4. T​HE​ ​ROLE​ ​OF​ ​VISUALS​ ​IN ​ ​MEDIATED ​ ​STRATEGIC ​ ​NARRATIVES  
Contrary to rational choice theory, which suggests informed and logical          
deliberation, the impact of visuals is based on the peculiarities of the human             
brain. The location of the visual cortex in the brain means that information             
from the visual stimulus is processed faster and more efficiently than data            
from the senses of hearing, touch, smell or taste (Zimmerman, 1989).           
Compared with words or text, images have a much longer history in            
evolutionary processes (Parker, 2003) and allow for faster inferences of          
relevant information (Newell, 1990). It has been argued that the internal           
mental processes of cognition begin with the visual appearance of an external            
stimulus and result in a behavioural response (Hopfinger and Mangun,          
2001). Therefore, scholars in the biological sciences assert that humans use           
their visual experience as the most prevalent method of learning without           
even realizing it (Barry, 2005; Damasio, 1999).  
Despite the importance of visuals in human sense-making processes,         
the role of an image and in particular visual representations of distant            
conflicts has only received thorough attention in media and communication          
studies in the beginning of this century. Parry (2010b) argues that the change             
in academic attitudes has been influenced by what W.J.T. Mitchell (1994)           
calls the ‘pictorial turn’ or ‘visual turn’ in the humanities and social sciences             
(cited in Parry, 2010b). The turn reflects the escalation of interest of scholars             
from varied disciplines to the apparently powerful roles of mediated visual           
imagery, employing conceptual tools such as ‘mediatisation’ and        
‘performativity’ (Parry, 2010b). A burst of scholarship on how images are           
used in information warfare around the conflicts occurred after 9/11 (Eder           
and Klonk, 2017; Hoskins and O’Loughlin, 2010; Kellner, 2006; Kennedy,          
2012; Kotilainen, 2011; Mirzoeff, 2005; Mitchell, 2011; O’Loughlin, 2011;         
Roger, 2013; Zelizer, 2010).  
Later, Roger (2013: p. 46) introduced the concept of ‘image warfare’ to            
argue that the media constitute ‘a distinct theatre of war – alongside land,             
sea and air – with images as key weapons (equivalent to bullets, bombs,             
missiles and mines) used to gain a specific strategic advantage over the            
enemy’. He refers to how Al-Qaeda has been exceptionally successful in           
deploying image munitions against the US and UK, which have in turn tried             
to compete in this war with counter-image munitions. Like munitions in           
traditional warfare, visuals may be strategically constructed, manipulated or         
carefully selected to convey an impression that communicates about a distant           
conflict. It has been argued that images do not aim to accurately depict news              
stories but to establish legibility and shape the perceptions of reality           
(Mirzoeff, 2011; Roger, 2013).  
Images, however, do not speak on their own. Being biologically          




and explain the complexities of social and political logic. Images gain           
significance through the way actors use and contextualize them. Miskimmon          
et al. (2013) emphasize that the perceived level of influence of images is             
based more on how they appear in a specific context than on their content.              
Edwards and Winkler (1997: p. 289) explain that, if images are to move the              
public, they need to ‘reflect not only beliefs, attitudes, and values of their             
creators, but those of the society at large’. It is here that images empower              
strategic narratives. 
Sontag (1977) was among the first to note that an image per se does              
not have social power, making clear that ‘a photograph that brings news of             
some unsuspected zone of misery cannot make a dent in public opinion            
unless there is an appropriate context of feeling and attitude’ (p. 17). She             
adds that ‘photographs cannot create a moral position, but they can reinforce            
one – and can help build a nascent one’ (p. 17). This view does not, however,                
deny the inherent symbolic power of visuals. On the contrary, visuality is            
recognized as having an influence that makes images neither subordinate to           
discourse nor mere illustrations or representations of reality (Schlag et al.,           
2015). Therefore, the discursive embeddedness of images directs our         
attention to the relations between visuality and strategic narratives as          
between two components that, working together, can amplify the         
effectiveness of each. As Miskimmon et al. (2013: p. 22) argue, in order to              
increase the effect of the strategic narratives, political actors need to learn            
‘how to visualize narrative and fit visuals of ongoing events into long-term            
strategic narratives’. 
The theorization of the image in strategic narratives draws upon          
O’Loughlin’s earlier work (2011) and shifts the focus from the content of            
images to what that content ​re-presents ​; i.e., how images are seen and            
interpreted (Miskimmon et al., 2013: p. 125). In these terms, an image is             
both a medium and a mode of experience, communication and knowledge,           
making ‘things’ visible. Therefore, in this dissertation, the focus is not only            
on the content of images but also – and even primarily – on ​how the events                
have been re-presented, visualized, embedded into the context and         
interpretative framework of the strategic narrative. Particular attention is         
paid to the combination of ‘the language and imagery through which           
meanings are produced and disseminated in societies’ (Hutchison, 2014: p.          
4; see also Bleiker, 2001).  
How can images communicate narratives? More specifically, why do         
they have the power to amplify strategic narratives? That images capture and            
appeal to emotions or even provoke an affective response is not a new topic              
in academic literature (Aday et. al., 2005; Graber, 1987, 1990; Perlmutter,           
2004; Pfau et. al., 2006; Schlag, 2018). The concept of strategic narratives,            
however, explains why some images move us while others do not evoke any             




most importantly, with what we imagine as our better selves, normally evoke            
powerful emotional replies (Kotilainen, 2011). 
Images can act as both a representation and a driver of emotions            
(Schlag, 2018: p. 211). On the one hand, images make moments of distress             
and joy visible to others; on the other, they direct our attention to specific              
events or issues and move us emotionally. Moreover, images represent the           
feelings of individuals and symbolize the emotions of communities. Thus,          
emotions are not (only) personal but (also) collective (Mercer, 2014). We can            
all certainly recall images that evoke personal feelings of love and hate and             
collective emotions of fear and shame (Schlag, 2018). This is because           
emotions have a history, too. How and ‘why we feel the way we do’ is a ‘social                 
and cultural process through which emotions are shaped in the first place’            
(Bleiker and Hutchison, 2018: p. 210; see also Ahmed, 2014). As collective            
phenomena, emotions are political in the sense that they function as           
evaluative judgments and social bonds between community members (see         
Fattah and Fierke, 2009: p. 70 and Nussbaum, 1996: p. 35). Emotions are             
thus embedded in strategic narratives with the same aim of constructing a            
shared ​feeling about events to help shape the behaviour of domestic and            
international actors (Miskimmon et al., 2013: p. 19).  
Understanding emotions on either an individual or a collective level as           
already mediated through representations means understanding strategic       
narratives. As Bleiker and Hutchinson (2014: p. 506) explicitly note, ‘all one            
can understand is the manner in which emotions are expressed and           
communicated’. That includes language as much as images. Given this          
argument, it is remarkable that scholarship has not yet conducted a           
systematic and thorough investigation of the television news, where visual          
presentations of events always accompany spoken text. Most often, the          
comparatively small volume of academic studies of the television news is           
explained by the methodological obstacles confronting a large-scale analysis.         
The details of the methodological challenges and the analysis model adopted           
in this dissertation are outlined in the fourth chapter (Methodology),          
specifically in the part that considers strategic narrative analysis in television           
news. 
3.5. R​USSIAN ​ ​MASTER ​ ​NARRATIVES​: ​HISTORICAL​ ​AND ​ ​CULTURAL 
IMAGINATION 
To be effective, narratives do not have to be based on evidence or factual              
analysis. The power of narratives is measured by the extent to which they             
resonate with the intended audience’s core social and cultural values, appeal           
to emotions and, at the same time, advocate a persuasive cause-and-effect           
description (Freedman, 2006: p. 23; see also Riessman, 2008). This          




Russia's state-run television channels and thus answers the call of          
Miskimmon et al. (2013, 2017) to provide insights into how particular events            
come to possess narrativity and emotional value for audiences.  
However, before starting to explore strategic narratives in the news, it           
is important to outline Russia’s master narratives, which constitute that          
specific context of contemporary Russian society. McLean et al. (2020: p.           
117) define master narratives as templates through which individuals make          
sense of the sequence of events or interpret the meaning of events connecting             
their own experiences with the collective experience and culture. Master          
narratives can be recognized since they are known by the majority of people             
within a particular culture and have a moral component which informs why            
certain groups are marginalized within society (McLean and Syed ​2015 ​). In           
most cases, people use master narratives unconsciously and uncritically to          
comprehend events (Colley, 2019). 
Consequently, those strategic narratives that are closely linked to         
master narratives appear to be naturally embedded into individuals’         
worldviews and, therefore, better communicate necessary strategic meanings        
about complicated phenomena or events. World War II, for example, as a            
master narrative, outlines an expected trajectory of the conflict that explains           
why the Russian government should fight back to repel the villain and what             
would happen if the government failed to do so. In the literature, this             
connection between master and strategic narratives is defined as coherence          
and fidelity (Fisher, 1989). ​While coherence is understood as the consistency           
of events in a narrative, fidelity is the force that connects the narrative with              
the a​udience’s pre-existing knowledge, experiences, myths and beliefs        
(Fisher, 1989).  
Thus, the current discourse climate is just as important as prior           
narratives, since bo ​th factors contribute to constructing the framework         
within which the audience interprets and understands the ongoing events.          
Below I outline ​three master narratives since they are most often referred to             
in the studied news on the crisis in Ukraine and the war in Syria. They are                
based, on the one hand, on the hostility of Western states and, on the other,               
on the historical inheritance of Russia as a superpower and victor over            
fascism in World War II (Cottiero et al., 2015; Hansen, 2015).  
3.5.1. R​USSIA​ ​VERSUS​ ​THE​ W​EST 
This narrative has not emerged spontaneously, nor is it new. As discussed            
above, the anti-Western narrative was already a salient feature of Russian           
political and media discourse long before the Ukraine crisis broke out and            
continued to be prominent during the war in Syria (Averre, 2019; Malinova,            
2014; Smyth and Soboleva, 2014; Yablokov, 2014; Zhurzhenko, 2015).         
Szostek (2017) argues that Russia’s anti-Western strategic narrative was         




public protests erupted over electoral fraud in December 2011 (p. 577). The            
protests and the performance of anti-Putin punk rockers Pussy Riot were           
interpreted by Putin and his supporters (at least in public) as a            
Western-backed plot (Szostek, 2017: p. 577). 
Despite similarities with the Cold War discourse, this master narrative          
has a less solid ideological base and appeals to a wide range of people with               
anti-Western, antiliberal and anti-globalist views (Waszczykowski, 2015).       
Although Szostek (2017) distinguishes anti-Western/American and      
anti-European sentiments in Russia’s strategic narratives, both are heavily         
based on binary oppositions and a well-rooted set of stereotypes, according           
to which Russia is spiritual, moral and loyal to traditional values, while the             
West is immoral and acts only to serve its vested interests (Malinova, 2014);             
and Europe is ‘false’ and has lost its moral values (Neumann, 1996, cited in              
Szostek, 2017: p. 578). During the Russian mission in Syria, this binary            
opposition was promoted especially heavily. The master narrative opposing         
Western liberalism co-exist with a positive Russian self-conception as a          
country that has achieved effective statehood, attained military superiority         
and regained its legitimate place in international society as a great power            
(Szostek, 2017: p. 585). 
This master narrative is flexible in the sense that it often combines            
ideologically conflicting discourses. Thus, it encompasses both Russia’s        
Orthodox Christian values and its communist legacies. Pomerantsev and         
Weiss (2014) refer to this as a ‘fluid approach to ideology’, which successfully             
combines leftist groups’ messages, such as fighting American hegemony and          
the stereotypical Western lifestyle in general, and right-wing nationalists’         
praise of anti-EU policies, intolerance of homosexuality and opposition to          
Islamic movements. In this narrative, Ukraine, after declaring its aspiration          
to become a member of the EU, became associated with the Western            
worldview and emerged as a traitor to the values shared by Russians. 
3.5.2. R​USSIA​ ​AS​ ​A​ ​VICTOR​ ​OVER​ ​FASCISM​ ​IN​ W​ORLD​ W​AR​ II  
This master narrative is based on the victory in World War II, which is seen               
as the most ‘sacred achievement’ in Russia’s history. Most importantly, due           
to almost 75 years of cultivating the memory and cult of World War II, the               
Russian people place that victory and their personal and collective          
experiences related to the war at the centre of their national identity. ​World             
War II memories can be invoked by a single phrase or image without actually              
telling the story that comprises the event. Such a phrase or image serves as a               
signifier that invokes not only a particular episode of World War II but also              
the stereotypes, values and, most importantly, emotions associated with this          
war.  
This master narrative has been heavily employed to discursively         




Spiessens, 2019). ​Playing up the ‘fascist’ card has proved to be an excellent             
instrument to ​bolster an existential threat frame that resonates extremely          
well in the post-Soviet space (Cottiero et al., 2015; Edele, 2017; Gaufman,            
2015; ​Kuzio, 2015; ​Spiessens, 2019). The Pro-Kremlin media consistently         
made emotive references to Banderovtsy (followers of the war-time         
Ukrainian Nazi collaborator Stepan Bandera) and accused the new Ukrainian          
government of tolerating and even containing Nazi extremists (Hutchings         
and Szostek, 2015). 
This master narrative has effectively whitewashed Soviet complicity        
and Stalin’s repressive regime, drawing only on sacrifice, unity, patriotism          
and unwavering loyalty to the state (Gzirian, 2015). Moreover, the narrative           
features Ukraine as a part of Russia’s glorious history and justifies Russia’s            
approach to an independent Ukraine by its being in the sphere of Russia’s             
geopolitical interests (Plokhy, 2000). Crimea, according to this master         
narrative, belongs to Russia as a ‘sacred place’ on the Russian cultural map,             
along with the ‘hero city’ of Sevastopol, which served as a place of pilgrimage              
in Soviet times thanks to the heroism of its defenders in World War II.              
Therefore, the annexation of Crimea did not meet resistance in Russia; on            
the contrary, it was supported by 88% of Russians in 2014 and still supported              
by 86% in 2019, even though it was followed by financial costs and political              
crises in Russia’s international relations (Levada Center, 2019c). 
3.5.3. R​USSIA​ ​AS​ ​A​ ​LEADER​ ​OF​ S ​LAVIC​ ​NATIONS 
The Soviet regime employed the metaphor of fraternity – ‘all nations are            
brothers’ – to inculcate a shared patriotism that it hoped would supplant            
existing and disparate national identities (Kuzio, 2015). This brotherhood         
narrative, however, later developed into what Lakoff (1996) describes as a           
‘strict family’ model, a construction that supposes an asymmetrical status of           
‘brothers’. A'Beckett (2012) revealed in her study of Russia’s most widely           
read newspapers that the media characterized Russia as a caring and mindful            
‘big brother’, with Ukraine among its ‘little brothers’. This multilevel          
construction of the ‘family’ included a niche for the so-called          
‘underdeveloped brothers in intelligence’, who were the Central Asian         
republics of the former Soviet Union. Thus, the narrative asserting that ‘all            
nations are brothers’ assumed the patronage of the ‘big brother’ and the            
compliance of the little and underdeveloped ‘brothers’. 
In addition to the bonds created during the Soviet regime, Ukraine           
also occupies a special place in the Russkiy Mir (Russian World) concept,            
which has re-emerged in political discourse following the dissolution of the           
Soviet Union. The concept was employed by the Russian government to           
overcome social and national disintegration. Laruelle (2015) argues that this          
concept is a powerful instrument employed by the Russian government, first,           




development of its neighbouring countries. Second, the concept facilitates         
reconnection between the global Russian diasporas who identify with         
Russian culture, language, historical memory and the Orthodox religion         
(Feklyunina, 2016; Zhurzhenko, 2015). Third, the concept embodies the         
brotherhood of the Slavic nations - Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. In this            
sense, the concept transcends both the contemporary and Soviet-era         
ideological constructions by identifying Russia as central to the ancient          
civilizations connected by sacred bonds between the Slavic nations that may           
be traced back to Prince Vladimir’s baptism of Kyiv in 988 (Zhurzhenko,            
2015). 
In view of the above, it would be misguided to suggest that, prior to              
the Ukraine crisis, the Russian media ascribed to Ukrainians qualities that           
emphasized independence or success in the state-building aspirations.        
However, after the Euromaidan, the Ukrainians’ image in the Russian media           
altered dramatically. In place of the narrative depicting a dependent ‘little           
brother’, the World War II-fuelled master narrative constructed an image of           
the Ukrainians as a dehumanized Other. 
Thus, anti-Western sentiments and historical memory, including       
Russia’s status as a leader of all Slavic nations, are important elements in the              
building of the dominant strategic narratives of Russian society in relation to            
the Ukraine crisis and the Syrian war. Kalinina (2016) emphasizes that by            
pulling the strings of the ‘Russian historical and cultural identity’ ‘anti-West           
xenophobia’ and ‘Russian patriotism’, the Russian government has tailored         






My core research goal was to explore how television news advanced strategic            
narratives that legitimized violence, human costs and engagement in the          
conflicts. This goal was posited with the awareness that there was no            
ready-made model of analysis that incorporated both the strategic narrative          
concept and the peculiarities of television news. Moreover, I aimed to           
examine the strategic narratives in their dynamics when the context was           
constantly changing.  
To achieve the goal, the dissertation is designed as three sub-studies           
that explore how strategic narratives are modified (1) when the relationship           
between the countries has significantly changed, (2) when they are aimed at            
different audiences (domestic and international) and (3) when they relate to           
two different conflicts: the Ukraine crisis and Syria’s civil war. Throughout all            
the sub-studies my main focus was on the ​visuals used in the news of              
Channel One and RT to advance the strategic narratives. As noted in the             
introduction to this thesis, my research question was as follows:  
 
How does Russian television news visually advance the        
strategic narratives related to the Ukrainian crisis and the civil          
war in Syria?  
 
This chapter is designed to discuss the existing methods for the           
analysis of the television news (section 4.1), the model of the data analysis             
employed in this dissertation (section 4.2), the sources of the data (section            
4.3) and what constitutes the data (section 4.4). Finally, the chapter outlines            
the ethical considerations of this research (section 4.5). 
4.1. A​NALYSING​ ​TELEVISION ​ ​NEWS 
Television news displays communicative complexity. News reports usually        
contain at least two modes of communication: texts that can be written (like             
signs or messages) or reproduced as an audio track (dialogues, journalists’           
comments) and visuals that can be still photographs but are generally           
moving pictures. In the analysis, it is also important to consider the political             
economy of the media ownership and the political, social and cultural           
context. Jones (2016) argues that without a dedicated methodology, there is           
always a risk that a researcher will overlook one of the threads and thus miss               
potentially important characteristics in a multi-layered meaning system like         
television news.  
Graber (2001, 2004) has offered a model for analysing television news           




at the time of the broadcast; (2) the anchor’s introduction and any            
editorializing by reporters; (3) audio-visual messages communicated by a         
mix of words, pictures and sounds; and (4) the interaction between the            
narrative elements within a single report or among reports in the same            
newscast. Even though these elements all appear perfectly logical and          
important to consider, they are difficult to reproduce and quantify. As a            
result, content analyses of television news often rely either on transcripts of            
texts, headlines and captions (Hall, 1981; Müller et al., 2012; Wilkes, 2015) or             
only on rough categories of visuals that can be easily measured (Coleman and             
Banning, 2006; Grabe and Bucy, 2009; Messaris and Abraham, 2001). 
Recently, there have been several other attempts to elaborate a          
working model for analysing television news. Cottle and Matthews (2013)          
argue that an approach based on the frame analysis better fits the realities of              
television news. They broaden the concept of frames by adding new           
analytical dimensions to address the genres and peculiarities of that medium.           
However, as Tomaščíková (2010) has noted, there is another challenge in the            
analysis of television news, which is the proliferation of framing modes           
created by spoken and written lingual signs, still and moving images,           
graphics and music, all of which create a highly complex grid of analytical             
units that can rapidly become unmanageable.  
Jones (2016) has refined Graber’s model by organizing the research          
into three steps: deciphering the audio, deciphering the visuals and          
contextualizing the meaning production within the political economy of the          
media. Jones dubs this a triadic multimodal approach to the analysis of            
television news. Methodologically, Jones has stated her preferences for         
semiotic (deciphering the visual) and discourse (deciphering the audio and          
text elements) analysis. She suggests starting by distinguishing a narrative in           
news as a first step, then analysing the visuals used in the television news in a                
second step and finally drawing conclusions from the juxtaposition between          
audio and visuals and the context of media production in the third step.  
As a result, to gain a detailed understanding of the strategic narratives            
in Russian television news, the present study employs a mixed-method          
approach. Following the definition of strategic narratives employed in this          
dissertation (strategic narrative as a set of media frames), my analytical           
framework draws mostly on the qualitative framing analysis of both textual           
and visual elements of news reports and on a quantitative approach. While            
the quantitative approach enables identification of the patterns and         
relational connections in the narratives, qualitative methods capture nuances         
in the interpretation of relational connections within and between the          
narratives. Thus, the complementary strengths of the two approaches call for           
a mixed-method design. In the next section, a description of a mixed-method            




4.2. M​ETHODS​ ​OF​ ​DATA​ ​ANALYSIS 
Drawing on work related to the analysis of television news (Berger, 2004;            
Graber, 2001, 2004; Shoemaker and Reese, 1996, 2014) and especially on           
Jones’s (2016) model, I have developed a model that approaches a television            
news report as a whole product that consists of different threads; omitting            
even one thread would mean learning only part of the story. The model             
follows Jones in a way that it allows for a blend of the different tracks of                
television news, from audio and visual to the political economy of these texts.             
However, instead of focusing on semiotics and discourse analyses, this          
research methodology combines a visual and media frame analysis with          
quantitative analysis.  
Building upon framing theory, I explore how the selected media          
portrayed actors and events related to the conflicts and what meanings were            
attached to or created about those key actors and events. Framing theory is             
based on the notion that the selective presentation of information impacts           
attitudes, decisions and behaviours (Chong and Druckman, 2007; Entman,         
1993; Gitlin, 1980). Scholars have argued that framing choices are an           
essential part of journalistic routines (van Gorp, 2010), a natural          
construction embedded into the public communication process (Nisbet,        
2010: p. 44) that is guided to some extent by ideology, newsworthiness and             
the context (Galtung and Ruge, 1965; Gitlin, 1980). 
At the heart of the scientific debates on framing are the methods of             
operationalizing and measurement. Some scholars propose a deductive        
strategy in which the frames are predefined, theoretically based on and thus            
limited to a specific set (Matthes and Kohring, 2008). In contrast,           
researchers who employ inductive methods suggest using an open-coding         
strategy that enables finding the frames from the data and analysing the data             
in a more complete fashion (van Gorp, 2010). I have employed both            
strategies in this dissertation. In Articles I and IV, the inductive strategy is             
applied, while the deductive strategy is used in Article III to identify the             
frames in the data. In Article II, both strategies are applied; when relying on              
pre-existing knowledge and frame elements, I explored the texts to find and            
cluster other frames into overarching groups of ideas. 
Visual framing is especially important in this research, not only          
because images have a powerful potential to influence the audience’s          
processing and interpretation of a message (Domke et al., 2002; Krause and            
Bucy, 2018), but also because images provide us with the information about            
the values, mindsets and current political paradigms of the message sender           
(Kotilainen, 2011). Another reason why visual framing analysis is emphasized          
here is the ability of images to convey or evoke certain emotions. Emotions             




and Bucy, 2018). In Article IV, the role of the emotions evoked by visuals in               
television news is explored and explained.  
The quantitative analysis focuses on an exploration of significant facts          
like what, where and how many times a given element is visualized or             
reproduced in oral or written texts. These percentages and frequencies are           
used to measure relationships between variables. The news stories were          
examined quantitatively and qualitatively on three levels: 1) image subject          
(visual representation of the news story); 2) headline and textual framing           
and 3) immediate news discourse context, (the background audio or caption           
framing). The tags that Channel One uses to track its news on its website              
were used to study the main topics of the news stories.  
To summarize, it is important to emphasize that this dissertation          
considers television news to be a multimodal construction, and, therefore,          
approaches all elements – visuals, written or spoken words and context – as             
equally important in the process of meaning-making and conveying a single           
message. Although visual studies and studies of strategic narratives are          
usually undertaken independently, this dissertation aims to synthesize them         
to study strategic narratives in television news. This is important because,           
besides television, our society is increasingly visual (Machin, 2014),         
especially with the latest information technologies like the internet and social           
media. The next section justifies the choice of sources of research material            
and provides insights into the political economy of the selected media.  
4.3. S​OURCES​ ​OF​ ​DATA  
The websites of two Russian television channels – Channel One and RT            
(former Russia Today) – constitute the main sources of research materials           
for this dissertation. In addition, I use Twitter and the StopFake website as             
data sources to explore the reception of the allegedly fake news by Twitter             
users. Below I explain why I have chosen to select my data from these              
sources.  
In the Russian media ecology, where the alternative voices have been           
m​arginalised (Hoskins & Shchelin, 2018), the traditional news media has          
retained its key role in bolstering pro-government narratives (Gaufman,         
2019; Szostek, 2018). In 2014, when the crisis in Ukraine started to unfold,             
around 90% of Russians cited television as their main source of information            
(Levada Center, 2014) and 59% were likely to trust their source of            
information (Levada Center, 2016). Although the Russian television audience         
has decreased to 74% by 2020, television remains the dominant and most            
pervasive news distribution medium and enjoys a relatively high level of trust            
(48–57% depending on the news topic) (Levada Center, 2020). 
Channel One (Pervyi Kanal) is technically only partly owned by the           




Teper, 2018). Prior to 2019, Channel One was the most watched channel in             
Russia, with around 80% of the domestic audience choosing it as their            
favourite information source (Levada Center, 2014b). Even though the         
channel remains one of the most popular sources of information in Russia,            
Channel One’s audience has declined significantly in 2019; it is 47% of            
Russians who choose this channel as a source of information at the time of              
data collection. Other popular channels in Russia in 2019 were Rossia-1 and            
NTV with 48% and 36% of Russians preferring them over other information            
sources accordingly (Levada Center, 2019a). Based on the popularity and          
trust rating of Channel One among Russian viewers, Channel One has been            
se ​lected as one of the main sources for the research material. 
In addition, Russia has broadcast networks through which it echoes its           
strategic narratives abroad. For example, Channel One broadcasts globally         
through its Channel One Russia Worldwide company. It produces and          
distributes adapted versions of Channel One and themed channels to 250           
million of viewers in 190 countries in CIS, Europe, America, Asia, the Middle             
East and claims to be the most widely distributed Russian-language media in            
the world ​4​. NTV also has its international version - NTV-Mir, though it has             
not been updating its website since 2017 ​5​. While Channel One Russia           
Worldwide and NTV-Mir primarily target the Russian-speaking audience        
living abroad, the globally recognized ​RT (previously Russia Today)         
targets the international publics who do not necessarily speak Russian          
(Voronova, 2017). Therefore, to explore the strategic narratives from a          
comparative perspective, I selected RT to collect the research data.  
Currently, RT has eight global round-the-clock TV channels and         
broadcasts in six languages. On its website, RT claims that it has a total              
weekly audience of 100 million viewers in 47 of 100+ countries globally, with             
the biggest part of the audience based in Europe ​6​. Deidre et al. (2013) have              
similarly noted that, while the outlet might not be among the most highly             
watched, it is certainly among the five most important international news           
channels in terms of distribution and presence throughout Europe, including          
CNN International, BBC World News, Al Jazeera (English) and Euronews          
(English).  
RT has been repeatedly criticized for producing pro-Kremlin        
propaganda. Hutchings and Szostek (2015) explored how RT and BBC World           
News interacted with their audiences on social media platforms during the           
2014 Sochi Winter Olympics and found that RT was uniquely skilled at            
turning daily events and the main topics discussed in Western online           
conversations into the narratives that subverted anything deemed        
4 ​More about Channel One Russia Worldwide on https://eng.1tv.com 
5 ​http://ntvmir.ntv.ru 




anti-Russian. Gessen (2014) and Szoldra (2014) pointed out that RT covered           
the events in Ukraine according to the Kremlin’s strategic narratives.  
The dissertation has the third, hybrid media, perspective. It is          
designed to extend our understanding of how strategic narratives advanced          
by traditional media circulate on the internet. My main focus was on the fake              
news which was broadcasted by Channel One to support the strategic           
narratives and debunked on the StopFake website. Therefore, for the hybrid           
media perspective, I collected the research data from StopFake website and           
Twitter.  
StopFake (stopfake.org) was launched in March 2014 in Kyiv as a           
crowdsourced project to fight misinformation emanating primarily from        
Russian media and the internet. It started as an initiative of journalism            
students but was joined by other professionals and computer-savvy internet          
users from Ukraine and elsewhere. The community mobilizes ordinary         
internet users to engage in detecting and revealing fabricated stories and           
images on the Ukraine crisis through a ‘Report a Fake’ button. The website             
now operates in 13 languages and has more than 187,000 followers on            
multiple social media platforms.  
Twitter is not an especially popular social network in Russia.          
Although the number of Twitter users in Russia is slowly growing, it remains             
only around 4% of the Russian population (Levada Center, 2019d); in 2014,            
it was around 3% (Levada Center, 2017). However, Twitter has been           
integrated into this study as one of the battlefields of information warfare.            
Zeitzoff (2014) holds that any (dis)information from governments, militaries         
or other official sources is met on Twitter with counter-propaganda          
campaigns. Additionally, and it is especially important for this dissertation,          
scholars widely recognize Twitter as a medium for public engagement with           
news that originates from mass media (Bruns and Burgess, 2015; Bruns et            
al., 2016; Hermida, 2010; Rambukkana, 2015). 
4.4. T​HE​ ​DATA 
This section provides a description of the research data used in this            
dissertation. Most data was collected with the help of the specially created            
computer code that retrieved all news reports from the selected sources           
according to the specific criteria. The criteria varied from study to study but             
mostly included the date and the tags or a search term like ‘Ukraine’ or              
‘Syria’. As a result, the dataset was constructed of the following information            
categories for every publication and a news report: (1) title, (2) full text of a               
news report or website publication, (3) date and time of publication, (4) tags,             
(5) original URL to access the visuals and (6) number of shares on social              
network platforms (available only for Channel One). To collect tweets, the           




The data from all four sources were coded and analysed to provide the             
ground for the three perspectives adopted in the dissertation: comparative,          
retrospective and hybrid media.  
Comparative perspective: While exploring the master narratives       
of Russia, I realized that they were all culturally and historically           
contextualized, and therefore, could potentially constitute a strong basis for          
the strategic narratives targeted at the ​domestic (Russian-speaking)        
audiences. However, I found it important to assess whether and how           
strategic narratives on Russian television would vary when they were          
broadcast to ​foreign audiences. For that, I assembled two datasets to           
analyze and compare. The first dataset consisted of the news aimed at the             
domestic (Russian-speaking) audience, and Channel One was selected as the          
data source. The second dataset consisted of the news aimed at the            
international (English-speaking) audience, and RT was selected as the data          
source. The news reports of both datasets were related to the Ukrainian crisis             
and released within the 14-month period from 1 December 2013 to 1            
February 2015. The first dataset included 6927 news reports published on the            
Channel One website (​www.1tv.ru ​). The second dataset included 1275 news          
reports published on the RT website (​www.rt.com ​). I used the websites           
instead of television channels’ records since it was technically easier to           
assemble the datasets. Ultimately, 1700 news stories (1239 from Channel          
One and 461 from RT) related to the crisis in Ukraine were sampled, coded              
and analysed. 
The conclusions I drew from comparing the strategic narratives aimed          
at the different audiences inspired me to explore whether and how the            
strategic narratives advanced by one and the same channel for the same            
(domestic) audience would differ if they were related to ​different          
international conflicts - the Ukraine crisis and the civil war in           
Syria​. Thus, I built two other datasets, consisting of 1232 and 2297 news             
reports related to the military conflicts in Syria and Ukraine, respectively,           
published on the Channel One website between 1 April 2014 and 31 March             
2016.  
Retrospective perspective: The Ukraine crisis changed the       
relationships between the countries (Russia and Ukraine) and people (living          
in these countries) rather abruptly. It gave ground and motivation for my            
retrospective sub-study: to identify how the conflict (re-)shaped the         
representation of the Ukrainian people in Russian news reports. For that, I            
examined the strategic narratives relating to Ukrainian people that circulated          
in the Russian television news both before and during the Ukraine crisis. The             
research material consists of news reports published on the Channel One           
website over a two-year time period consisting of two phases: stories from            
the pre-conflict phase (1 November 2012 – 31 October 2013) and stories from             




2014). From the first phase, 383 news reports were collected, while 6963            
news reports were gathered from the second phase, 7346 items a total. The             
assembled news reports were then filtered to generate a sample of the most             
shared or liked reports on the social media networks within a month of their              
publication (the Channel One website displays the numbers of shares and           
likes below each publication). As a result, 480 news reports were sampled            
and coded.  
Hybrid media perspective: This perspective was designed to        
explore how engagement with the strategic narratives advanced by Russia's          
mainstream television news played out on social media networks. My goal           
was to examine how Twitter users judged the veracity of the news reports             
released by Channel One and contributed to the perpetuation of the strategic            
narratives. For that, I assembled two datasets. The first consisted of 6043            
tweets produced by 5391 users in relation to the news stories broadcast by             
Channel One about the Ukraine crisis between 1 December 2013 and 1            
February 2015. The second dataset consisted of 31 stories published on the            
Ukrainian fact-checking website StopFake (https://www.stopfake.org) that      
debunk the news broadcast by Channel One.  
4.5. E​THICAL ​ ​CONSIDERATIONS 
The research ethics includes both legal regulations (non-maleficence        
regulations) and the requirements of objectivity. It is essential for any scholar            
to avoid inaccurate approaches in argumentation, analytical procedures or         
conclusions. It is thus important to be transparent and self-reflexive. In this            
dissertation, I worked with the media content, which demanded increased          
objectivity as I worked with the content deliberately constructed to influence           
and stir emotions. To avoid inaccuracy in coding and analysis, I used            
percentage agreement and Krippendorff’s alpha (α). A second coder coded          
20% of the samples to test the coding reliability. The r​esults of the reliability              
testing indicated a high level of agreement between coders and did not            
exceed α = 0.84.  
As to the legal regulations, my biggest concern was the visuals used in             
the telev​ision news and as the data in my dissertation. Although my data did              
not involve any private information or interviews and the visuals were           
published on the television websites and thus publicly available, they          
nevertheless were primarily the images of private people. After consulting          
and reflecting on multiple sources concerned with the qualitative research          
ethics (Favaro et al., 2017; Iphofen and Tolich, 2018), I decided to approach             
the online open-access mainstream news sites as public spaces. I considered           
it reasonable to assume that individuals filmed for the news reports were            
informed by the journalists about why they were being filmed and where (the             




Accordingly, I viewed it as ethically acceptable to collect and use these news             
reports as data without informed consent from those filmed in the reports. 
At the same time, based on the understanding that the content had            
been created for an audience and context different from the academic           
research, I decided it would be more ethically appropriate to privilege           
adopting anonymizing measures and not to collect, store or publicly reveal           
any revealing or personal details attached to the videos. Thus, in addition to             
the open accessibility criteria, I decided not to publish in my articles any data              




Summary of findings 
5. S​UMMARY​ ​OF​ ​FINDINGS  
This chapter presents the findings arising from the data analysis. It is            
organized according to the dissertation’s perspectives on the study of          
strategic narratives: comparative (section 5.1), retrospective (section 5.2) and         
hybrid media (section 5.3).  
5.1. C​OMPARATIVE​ ​PERSPECTIVE​: ​DOMESTIC ​ ​NEWS​ ​VERSUS 
INTERNATIONAL​ ​NEWS​ ​AND ​ ​THE ​ U ​KRAINIAN​ ​CONFLICT​ ​VERSUS​ ​THE 
S​YRIAN ​ ​WAR   
The empirical work from the comparative perspective resulted in two          
publications. The first (​Article I​) was published as a book chapter. Its            
objective was to examine whether and how the strategic narratives on the            
Russian television constructed around the Ukraine crisis differed when they          
were broadcast for the domestic as opposed to foreign audiences. Two           
sources of research material were selected: Channel One as a prominent           
news source for the domestic audience and RT as the main source for             
conveying the Russian strategic narratives abroad. The study collates         
quantitative and qualitative results based on the frequency of the media           
frames employed by these two TV channels.  
In exploring the media frames, the study identifies how meanings are           
ascribed to certain events by placing them in the dominant narratives. The            
news reports were examined on three levels: visualization of the main           
character(s); visualization of the plot, headlines and textual framings; and          
the juxtaposition between audio and visuals and the context of media           
production. The tags on the Channel One website were used to study the             
main themes of the news reports. 
Since both channels have been often criticized for being propaganda          
mouthpieces of the Russian government, there was no expectation that the           
channels would present the crisis in Ukraine neutrally and without bias.           
However, there was an assumption that the channels might employ different           
narratives to address their different audiences and try to accord with the            
specific cultural and social values of those audiences. The overall findings           
supported the idea that the news reports published on both channels’           
websites were presented in a way that reflected all three master narratives:            
the malicious intentions of the West against Russia, the crisis in Ukraine as a              
threat from fascism and an emphasis on the cultural and spiritual unity            
between Ukraine and Russia, with Russia the dominant figure in this unity.  
There was considerable overlap in how both channels covered the          
crisis with respect to the strategic narratives. However, some frames were           




frame the crisis mostly within the Russia-versus-the-West strategic narrative,         
Channel One mostly appealed to the historical memory and to the spiritual            
and cultural commonality between Russia and Ukraine. RT more often          
employed the frames portraying the West (mostly visually represented by the           
US government members, but also EU officials) as interfering, biased and           
responsible for the political and economic turmoil in Ukraine and for the            
worsening relationship between Russia and Ukraine. Channel One portrayed         
Ukraine as a failing state beset by a growing radical nationalist (i.e., fascist)             
threat and economic troubles. ​Thus, the strategic narrative offered a shortcut           
to represent Crimea and the eastern regions of Ukraine desperately wishing           
to join Russia. 
It is worth noting that RT mainly used photographs in its reports,            
whereas Channel One primarily used videos. The RT photos generally          
showed official figures, while Channel One’s videos focused on ordinary          
people. While this difference in visualizing the conflict might invite a number            
of interpretations, I think that there are two main reasons. First, Channel            
One appeared to be attempting to contextualize the conflict with the           
audience’s previous knowledge of the conflict itself and the countries          
involved. Second, and more importantly, this suggests that the conflict was           
supposed to evoke different emotions and shape different perceptions in          
different audiences. For the international audience, the conflict was         
presented from its non-humanitarian side, typically as vicious intrigues by          
the US against Russia. The domestic audience was shown emotional          
portrayals of suffering victims who were similar to the viewers. The findings            
also revealed that visuals did not necessarily correspond to the textual and            
audio descriptions – this was most obvious regarding Euromaidan, where          
many news reports had the titles and textual and/or spoken descriptions           
with the narrative about a fascist threat and disorder caused by the            
protestors, although the images presented peaceful protestors and smiling         
people. It invites us to think about what we actually ​watch on TV and accept               
a​s visual proof of a news report.  
Art ​icle IV has been designed to explore the visual images used by            
Channel One to advance the strategic narratives around the military conflict           
in Ukraine and Russia’s intervention into Syria’s civil war. Although the legal,            
officially declared, status of engagement of Russia in these two conflicts is            
different, both conflicts have been accompanied by remarkable media         
campaigns in Russia to mobilize publics in support of the Kremlin’s political            
decisions. The study compares the visuals used by Channel One to report on             
each of the conflicts and identifies how the visuals reproduce the strategic            
narrat ​ives.  
Visual images, the article argues, bring emotional resonance to the          
strategic narrative. They provide the public with the emotional resources that           
are key for understanding complex political ideas and situations (Hariman          
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and Lucaites, 2007: p. 156; see also Hariman and Lucaites, 2002) and, on the              
other hand, anchor them in everyday discourse (Höijer, 2010) and collective           
memory (Zelizer, 1998). Accordingly, in this article, I conceptualise visual          
images as ​affective anchors that can be used to reactivate collective memory            
and dominant discourses and construct emotional relationships between        
audience and mediated events. 
While focusing on the visuals, the analysis, however, does not dismiss           
the v​erbal elements in the news content. ​I apply framing analysis of audio             
and visual elements in Channel One’ news reports, taking into account the            
combinations of text and verbal comments coming along with the visual           
images. ​In the analysis, I used ​four coding categories of visuals: key actors,             
visual display of suffering (or absence), visual display of the conflict/war (or            
battle aftermath), the main theme (interpretation of visuals through ​verbal          
comments) and sources of visuals. I used these coding categories for           
quantitative and qualitative analysis. Within the quantitative approach, I         
compared the patterns of visuals employed for reporting on different          
conflicts (focus on particular actors and themes). With the qualitative          
approach, I identified the presence of identity, issue and/or system          
narratives (​Roselle et al., 2014; Miskimmon and O’Loughlin, 2017) and          
explored the frames which activated or neutralized the emotions as a part of             
legitimizing political decisions about involvement in the international        
conflicts.  
The data showed that in the Ukraine crisis, Channel One’s visual           
reporting focused on the suffering of civilians. Channel One repeatedly          
appropriated the trope of child and mother as a moral and emotional            
intensifier. The footage of mothers worked to stir up anger vis-á-vis the            
evil-doer who inflicted the suffering on their families. Even though the           
images of actual violent acts against civilians were not present in reporting,            
Channel One visualised the military aggression of the Ukrainian army          
through the focus on the battle aftermath (human consequences like injured,           
killed, suffering civilians or destroyed buildings or infrastructure) in the          
southeastern regions. The verbal comments in reports guided the         
interpretation of the visuals as the war of the fascist-minded Ukrainian           
government against the Russian-speaking population in Ukraine.  
Visual reporting on the Syrian conflict converged around a narrow          
range of visual themes, dominated by the images of Russian weaponry. The            
military power of Russia then was constructed through showcasing their          
military arsenal. The reporting on the conflict represented what Kellner          
(1992) defined as a ‘techno-war’, void of images of suffering civilians and            
violent consequences of the war. Journalists’ commentary underlined        
significantly improved Russian military capabilities and Russia’s increasingly        
prominent status as a military power in the world. The military and            




military failures of the US and its allies. Within this frame, the Russian             
operation in Syria was represented as a noble mission of Russia to fight             
Islamic terrorism and US global hegemony (Teper 2018: 82) 
Thus, the data revealed that Channel One used different affect stimuli           
while covering the conflict in Ukraine and the war in Syria. While the             
projection of Ukrainian conflict was anchored in compassion to the Eastern           
Ukraine population speaking the Russian language, the Syrian war was          
framed to fuel the feeling of national pride by focusing on the Russian             
greatness as a political and military superpower. ​The research extends the           
theoretical understanding about media representation of war, specifically        
how the changing political context impacts which identities are represented          
and made potent through appeals to different emotions. The article          
demonstrates that ​the strategic narratives are, thus, fluid in the sense that            
they can be modified and adapted to the political purposes and audience’s            
expectations.  
5.2. R​ETROSPECTIVE ​ ​PERSPECTIVE​: ​TRANSFORMATION ​ ​OF​ ​STRATEGIC 
NARRATIVE​ ​WITHIN ​ ​A ​ ​TIME ​ ​PERIOD  
Article III explores how Russian television news has deconstructed the          
narrative embracing Ukrainians as ‘brothers’ through repositioning them        
within an imagined social reality wherein Ukrainians assume the guise of a            
threatening ‘Other’. The media frames comprising visual, auditory and         
textual streams were analysed to explore the narratives about Ukrainians          
that were promulgated both a year before and a year after the Ukraine crisis              
started. To explore which group of Ukrainians was specifically ‘othered’ in           
the media, the study distinguished between two actors (characters) within          
the broader category of Ukrainians: ordinary people and the government or           
army. Ordinary people were subdivided into representatives of eastern         
Ukraine (the main locus of the violent conflict) and the rest of the Ukrainian              
population. At different stages of the conflict, the government category was           
repre​sented by the cabinet of either Yanukovych or Poroshenko. 
The findings highlight that Channel One manipulated the        
representations of Ukrain​ians to specifically appeal to the cultural, historical          
and spiritual values of the domestic Russian audience. Thus, prior to           
Euromaidan, Ukrainians were portrayed as a ‘little brother’ dependent on          
Russia’s guidance and support but with shared origins and values. This           
narrative, emphasizing Ukraine as a fraternal but subordinate partner, was          
part of Russia’s response to the identity crisis caused by the fall of the Soviet               
Union and aimed to reinforce Russia’s position among neighbouring and          
post-Soviet countries (Miskimmon and O’Loughlin, 2017).  
The transformation of this image began with the narrative of betrayal,           
wherein any political choice that did not favour Russia was interpreted as            
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irrational or misguided. However, the irrationality of Ukraine’s political         
choice was not justification enough to mobilize the domestic audience          
around the Russian government’s decision to send troops to Crimea, to           
annex Crimea and to support the war in eastern Ukraine. For that, a specific              
narrative that created a sense of real threat was required. 
This sense of threat gained traction through the persistent focus on           
the violent nature of some radical groups’ representatives and by demonizing           
those groups, which contributed to the portrayal of Euromaidan as Nazi           
riots. The fact that the image of fascism was already embedded in the public              
discourse relieved the media of the need to create a new ensemble of negative              
conceptions to describe the Other; the familiar images of fascism provided a            
shortcut to the desired public response. Thus, through constant references to           
fascism, the use of vocabulary and music that evoked World War II and the              
broadcast of documentaries about Nazi crimes, Channel One replaced         
Ukraine’s original intention of developing closer ties with the EU with a            
narrative in which Ukraine turned away from Russia to embrace fascism,           
which is the ultimate evil from the perspective of the Russian-speaking           
public. 
While reporting about war crimes, ​images of the enemy were not           
always present. The crimes ascribed to the enemy were generally represented           
only by text and in audio commentaries. The multimodality of television           
news permitted the media to ascribe certain meanings to these images           
through the complex grid of disparate yet interconnected frames comprising          
spoken and written lingual signs along with graphics and music. For           
example, the visual documentation of landscapes, destroyed houses and         
casualties was textually or orally interpreted as evidence of the crimes           
committed by the Ukrainian government and the army. The use of evocative            
music and references to the events of World War II in the news reports              
contributed to the creation of a framework within which Ukrainians were           
cast as reincarnated fascists. 
5.3. H​YBRID ​ ​MEDIA ​ ​PERSPECTIVE​: ​CHALLENGING​ ​DOMINANT​ ​STRATEGIC 
NARRATIVES​ ​ONLINE  
Article II places the emphasis on the internet, which allows other players to             
challenge the Kremlin’s narratives by providing counter-narratives and        
debunking distorted information and fake images. Accounting for the new          
media ecology through which strategic narratives are interpreted, Article II          
scrutinizes first the narratives of allegedly fake news on Channel One,           
assuming the fabricated stories to be extreme projections of Russia’s          
strategic narratives, and then the attempts of the Ukrainian fact-checking          
website Stopfake.org to counter the Russian narrative by refuting         




article analyses how Twitter users commented on the news and contributed           
to the wider discussion about television news. The sentiments contained in           
individual Russian-, Ukrainian- and English-language tweets were       
categorized as either explicitly trusting or distrusting the relevant news          
report.  
The findings support the claim by Miskimmon et al. (2014) that           
strategic narratives are fragile in today’s online environment. They can still           
exploit powerful symbolic resources and identity claims to create legitimacy,          
as Channel One does with regard to the Ukrainian conflict, but the internet             
makes it challenging to convince an audience or even limit the audience to             
within a country’s borders. This article provides evidence that the strategic           
narratives projected by the popular information source no longer enjoy the           
same level of media dominance and, therefore, need to be constantly           
supported by new engaging stories to generate discussion and keep the focus            
of the audience on the topic. This may explain why Channel One produced a              
number of fake news stories and allowed inconsistencies in their reporting. 
The analysis of the Twitter strand showed that online users, on the            
whole, are rather sceptical about the accuracy of the mainstream media           
strategic narratives from Russia. The tweets revealed that the users were           
aware of the strategic narratives deployed by Russia’s TV. In addition, while            
they might adopt the terms offered by Channel One to describe the events             
and actors, they made clear that they distrusted Channel One and some of its              
content in particular. Some users also demonstrate their own ability to           
contribute to the debunking practices by pointing out inconsistencies in the           
details of a report, finding images that have been used to create allegedly fake              
news reports, using verification sources like webcams available on the          
internet or creating their own reports from the scene of an alleged event. 
One of the important conclusions is that strategic narratives do not           
always aim to make a rational point; in contrast to the claims by Miskimmon              
et al. (2014), the power of strategic narratives does not solely rest on their              
credibility. The strategic narratives carried by Channel One’s journalistically         
dubious stories seek, in the first place, to appeal to emotions and to blur the               
border between what is real and what is not. This kind of reports forms a               
context in which other messages can be communicated with greater ease (cf.            
Oates, 2014; Pomerantsev, 2014). At the same time, strategic narratives are           
conditioned by a diffused media ecology in which narratives are evaluated           
and discussed by any number of political actors and the general public. Even             
though the internet community in Russia is not as large or active as in the US                
or other Western countries, the study shows that even Russia cannot avoid            
the consequences of this growing trend. Especially during conflicts, which          
provide fertile territory for controversy and suspicion to arise, the internet           




Discussion and conclusion 
6. D ​ISCUSSION​ ​AND​ ​CONCLUSION 
The crisis in Ukraine has revealed that Russia’s mainstream media is           
increasingly instrumentalized in information warfare to mobilize (domestic        
and international) public support for the Kremlin’s foreign policies, including          
the annexation of Crimea and engagement, despite official denials, in the           
military conflict in eastern Ukraine. The media has also been used to            
convincingly represent the reasons for the human and financial costs related           
to Russia’s intervention in Syria. Still, a comprehensive and longitudinal          
investigation of Russian strategic narratives as a representation of         
weaponized information has been lacking, and this dissertation is intended to           
fill this void. It explores dominant Russian strategic narratives over two years            
and assesses their development and advancement over time, as well as the            
variations they have undergone depending on the conflict, target audience          
and political context. This final chapter offers a discussion of the main            
findings (section 6.1), reflections on the challenges and limitations of this           
research (section 6.2) and conclusions (sub-chapter 6.3). 
6.1. M​AIN​ ​FINDINGS 
6.1.1. I​MPORTANT​ ​ASSET​ ​IN​ ​INFORMATION​ ​WARFARE 
The literature emphasizes that in order to be effective the strategic narratives            
must resonate with the values, expectations and prejudices of the intended           
audiences at a given moment in history (Freedman, 2006; Riessman, 2008).           
Indeed, the cultural and historical context of Russia is reflected in the            
dominant strategic narratives. They show that the perception of the hostility           
of Western states has originated in Cold War confrontations, that superiority           
of Russian statehood over other, ‘little brother’ nations can be t ​raced to the             
politics of the Soviet Union and that the idea of a fascist threat spreading in               
Ukraine draws on the horrific experiences of both nations - Russia and            
Ukraine - in World War II. The analysis of the data has revealed that these               
historical references have been intensively exploited to strategically        
(re-)present the conflicts and main actors throughout the selected news          
reports. 
Strategic narratives have proven to be a valuable asset in information           
warfare. The fabricated news that was studied from the hybrid media           
perspective (​Article II​) appeared to be the distillations of the dominant           
strategic narratives. The diffuse media environment in which the         
contemporary propaganda campaigns are constructed requires continuous       
engagement and support of the strategic narratives to cope with numerous           




perception of emerging events for multiple audiences (Miskimmon et al.,          
2014). In this light, fabricated and bizarre news reports circulating widely on            
the internet can be understood as agitation propaganda designed to provoke           
an affective response from the public. In Russia, as we have observed, where             
most people watch television and televisio ​n is largely controlled by the           
government, fake news accomplishes its goal quite successfully. Thus, fake          
news becomes a part or sometimes even an ultimate expression of the            
strategic narratives integrated with the purpose to increase the public debate           
around particular themes and, most importantly, to create a specific ​feeling           
about these themes.  
Although the internet in Russia is nowhere near television in terms of            
popularity when it comes to information function, especially among older          
people, pollsters report that it is on pace to become a more powerful             
participant in the media landscape (Chapter 2). The Russian government is           
aware of this trend an​d tries to reach the public through superficial social             
media accounts and websites (trolls) that amplify the government’s strategic          
narratives online (section 2.3). Therefore, it was something of a surprise to            
learn that Twitter users in Russia did not always share their compatriots’            
preferences to television news as the information source in general and to            
Channel One in particular. From the hybrid media perspective, I explored           
how Channel One’s fake news as the extreme projection of Russia’s strategic            
narratives was perceived by Twitter users. The content analysis of tweets           
showed a comparatively high level of distrust regarding the news from           
Channel One (50.7 % of all tweets). The strongest emotions in tweets were             
sarcasm and then disgust targeted at the Russian propaganda on Channel           
One in general or at the content of a specific news report in particular.              
Sarcastic remarks were made with the intention of making the bizarre nature            
of the news conspicuous. 
The study of fake news (​Article II​) also demonstrates that the           
dominant strategic narratives use plain, emotional language and direct         
parallels with historical events and actors. Through parallels with the          
powerful historical events, the narratives imbue well organized and         
simplified meanings to the current events. This kind of meanings is easy to             
communicate, comprehend and remember not only because it reflects and          
fits in the existing shared value system but also – and especially – due to the                
structure of the strategic narratives, which includes a simplified plot and           
characters’ roles and direct and emotionally powerful parallels with the          
traumatizing parts of shared historical memory and public identities. 
6.1.2. F​LUID​ ​CONSTRUCTION​ ​OF​ ​STRATEGIC​ ​NARRATIVES  
Strategic narrative is not static. Since it has arisen and proved to be effective,              
it continues to evolve over time with changes in the political context,            
international relations and target audiences. There is a lack of evidence in            
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existing research on whether and how a strategic narrative is modified to            
reflect the changing conditions. This dissertation contributes to the literature          
by focusing on how strategic narratives vary depending on the target           
audience and conflict, how they evolve over time and, especially, how the            
mass media can reflect and contribute to changes in the relationship between            
two or more countries.  
Article III revealed not only the temporal acceleration but also the           
temporal fragility of strategic narratives. The apparently settled meaning of          
past events can be disrupted by the emergence of new conditions or changes             
in the political context that force a reconsideration of the dominant strategic            
narrative. Specifically, the study revealed ​a dramatic change in the role that            
Ukrainians played in the dominant Russian strategic narrative prior to and           
after the Ukraine crisis started. Prior to the Ukraine crisis, the Russian media             
ascribed to Ukrainians qualities that emphasized their spiritual and cultural          
similarity to Russians, ties of ‘brotherhood’ and political unity. For decades,           
these similarities were strategically exploited to develop a narrative in which           
Ukrainians were routinely portrayed as a part of the in-group. However, after            
Euromaidan, the im​age of ​Ukrainians ​in the Russian media was radically           
altered. In place of a narrative depicting a dependent little brother, a new             
strategic narrative emphasizing Ukrainians’ dehumanized Otherness took       
shape. Thus, changes in the role of one of the main characters impacted the              
plot of the strategic narrative related to the conflict between Ukraine and            
Russia.  
The threatening otherness of Ukrainians was shaped with the help of           
the World War II cult. Vuorinen (2012: p. 5) emphasizes that to be             
convincing the enemy’s image must be ‘easily recognisable, openly         
threatening, rationally or at least pseudo-rationally justifiable, and        
emotionally touching’. The fact that the image of fascism was already deeply            
embedded in the public discourse relieved the media of the need to create a              
new ensemble of negative conceptions to describe the Other. The familiar           
images of fascism offered a shortcut to the desired public response. Thus,            
Article III demonstrated how through constant references to fascism, the          
use of vocabulary and music evocative of World War II and the broadcast of              
documentaries about Nazi crimes, Channel One gradually replaced Ukraine’s         
original intention of developing closer ties with the EU with a narrative in             
which Ukraine turned away from Russia to embrace fascism, the ultimate evil            
from the perspective of the Russian-speaking public. This image of          
Ukrainians and Ukraine was used to create the feeling of the threat and,             
consequently, represented Crimea and Ukraine eastern regions as being in          
distress and expecting the involvement of Russia to save the          
Russian-speaking population. The research results demonstrate not only that         
strategic narratives are fluid and adaptive to the context, but also ​how the             




The volatility of strategic narratives has been also revealed from the           
comparative perspective of the dissertation. ​Articles I ​and ​IV showed that           
links between the national imagination and narrative conventions varied         
accordingly. To demonstrate this, ​Article IV provided a comparative         
analysis of the strategic narratives that Channel One used to inform the            
domestic audience about two conflicts at roughly the same period of time.            
The strategic narrative explaining Russia’s political approach to the military          
conflict in eastern Ukraine and engagement in Syria highlighted different          
parts of the collective Russian identity. The analysis revealed that Channel           
One used different affective and emotional stimuli in covering the conflict in            
Ukraine and the war in Syria. While the Ukrainian conflict was constructed            
around feelings of empathy for the Russian-speaking population of eastern          
Ukraine, the Syrian war was represented by reinforcing the sense of Russia’s            
greatness as a political and military power. The strategic narrative around           
the Ukrainian conflict was almost entirely based on personal testimonies (up           
to 86% of all sampled reports), but the Syrian war was narrated through the              
figures, maps and statistics ​to reinforce the sense of distance as it was             
formulated in ​Wolfsfeld et al.’s definition of ​defensive mode (2008)​. The           
focus on human suffering in the reports on the Ukrainian conflict was            
established through language and images that recalled World War II, and the            
focus on Russia as a reawakening great power and indispensable          
international actor in the reports on the war in Syria was established through             
Cold War rhetoric. 
The analysis of the news related to one and the same conflict – the              
Ukraine crisis – but broadcast to different audiences – domestic and           
international – supported the idea that the news was constructed according           
to the existing narratives that could be modified depending on the specific            
characteristics of an audience. Although the findings in ​Article I do not            
demonstrate significant differences between the strategic narratives       
employed for different audiences, they nevertheless reveal that the news          
emphasizes different aspects when addressing different audiences. Thus,        
while Channel One appealed to the traumatic memories related to World           
War II in shaping a narrative of the Ukraine crisis for the domestic audience,              
that same crisis was framed by RT for the international audience as a             
confrontation between Russia and the West. These findings also resonate          
with the argument by Dimitrova et al. (2005), which suggests that even            
although news can be anticipated to be consumed by a global audience, it is              
constructed according to the political, economic and social fabric of the news            
producer. 
6.1.3. D​IFFERENTIATED​ ​VISIBILITIES 
Despite the prominence of state-sponsored television in Russia’s media and          
political landscapes, the visuals embedded in Russian television news have          
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received surprisingly little scholarly attention to date. This dissertation fills          
this gap by exploring the role of visuals in advancing strategic narratives in             
television news. In reviewing a large amount of visual material, the most            
striking discovery was that visuals employed in news reports did not always            
represent justifications for the narratives emphasized in the headlines or          
captions, whether spoken or written. The headlines were sometimes         
inappropriately illustrated with the pictures of politicians (RT) or landscapes          
(Channel One) instead of visualizing the correspondent’s stories of the          
conflict. In addition, RT often invited international experts supportive of          
Russian government policy to expound on the key narratives. Channel One,           
on the other hand, illustrated its news reports about the events in Ukraine             
with the episodes of historical documentaries about World War II, including           
original sound effects and music, as ​Articles I​ and ​III​ demonstrated. 
Furthermore, the comparative analysis of the visuals on Channel One          
and RT revealed that Channel One typically visualized the Ukrainian conflict           
by using emotional videos depicting personal stories and civilian suffering.          
The main actors who received prominent visibility in Channel One reports           
about the crisis were civilians, the Russian-speaking eastern Ukrainians         
mostly represented by women with children or families, as ​Articles I and ​IV             
showed. RT avoided visualizing scenes of the events and suffering of people;            
it mostly used still pictures of officials and political leaders (​Article I​).            
Interestingly, Channel One gave almost no visibility to Syrian civilians and           
their suffering while covering the war in Syria. The most visible actors were             
Russian officials and the central visualized theme: Russian military         
equipment (​Article IV ​). Given the importance of military strength in          
Russia’s self-perception as a great power, it was not a surprise that Channel             
One emphasized Russian military might, which was deployed in the area of            
conflict. 
Before the strategic narrative that positioned Ukrainians as        
threatening others was constructed, Channel One had advanced a narrative          
focusing on the fraternal relationship between Russians and Ukrainians. The          
ties of brotherhood were depicted by focusing on Ukrainians speaking          
Russian and accompanied by symbols referring to the people’s common          
history and Orthodox religion. The close relationship between the countries          
was also visualized by images of presidents, government members, military          
officers and clergy of both countries participating in significant rituals,          
including church services, wreath-laying ceremonies at World War II         
monuments, joint military exercises and official declarations delivered with         
national flags as a backdrop ( ​Article III​). 
The data analysis distinguished a different narrative concerning those         
Ukrainians who did not support Euromaidan but rather sought closer          
cooperation with Russia. Pro-Russia Ukrainians were represented by two         




to protect their families and land from Ukrainian nationalists. The refugees           
presented were mostly women with children who had left their homes in            
Ukraine and fled to Russia. The separatists were visually represented by men            
in camouflage. Both refugees and rebels spoke Russian and were portrayed           
as sharing Russia’s cultural and ideological values. The images of the           
refugees were supported with references to the number of casualties with a            
focus on killed or wounded children and the aid provided by the Russian             
government and private Russian people to the Ukrainian refugees. Thus, as           
Articles III ​and IV revealed, the image of the ordinary Ukrainian was            
bifurcated. News reports visualized a nationalist-minded and Russophobic        
Ukrainian while simultaneously promulgating a heroic image of the         
oppressed Russian-speaking Ukrainian. It must be emphasized that news         
coverage did not portray pro-Russia Ukrainians as part of the in-group: they            
were still very much Others, but they were portrayed with a significant            
degree of sympathy.  
The findings showed that visuals were selected to accord with the           
strategic narratives. It is even more accurate to say that the visibility of             
certain actors and themes was constructed to follow the strategic narratives.           
Any themes and actors that could not be depicted for some reasons but were              
important parts of the strategic narratives were made salient through textual           
or oral interpretation and sound effects like special war-related popular          
songs and documentaries. The most powerful example is the visualization of           
the crimes ascribed to the Ukrainian army. As ​Article IV revealed, there was             
not a single image of Ukrainian soldiers attacking self-defence combatants or           
civilians. Instead, the images of consequences like destruction and the          
personal stories of victims and refugees were presented with the text or voice             
comments as the results of the war crimes committed by the Ukrainian army.             
These images represented suffering and devastation, provoking moral        
judgment and powerful emotional response. 
6.2. C​RITICAL​ ​REFLECTION ​: ​LIMITATIONS ​ ​OF​ ​THE ​ ​STUDY​ ​AND ​ ​QUESTIONS 
FOR ​ ​FUTURE ​ ​STUDIES 
I acknowledge that this research has limitations. First, like many researchers           
working with moving images, I had to confront the ​methodological          
challenges related to the semiotic complexity of visual materials. Television          
news is a multi-semiotic and multimodal construction that requires a          
researcher to consider both verbal and non-verbal components, including         
symbols, sounds and music. Since my initial aim was to investigate how            
strategic narratives persisted or changed over the course of international          
crises and in different contexts, I needed to analyse a comparatively large            
amount of data. Thus, I had to select a very limited number of news elements               
for analysis. The selection of an item, even when a conscious choice, implies             
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abandoning some elements in favour of others. As a result, it is not possible              
to ascertain the legitimacy, ‘veracity’ or completeness of the findings. Finally,           
since there was no established methodology to analyse television news, I           
decided to adopt a combination of multimodal methodologies, integrating         
verbal and non-verbal elements as equals that constituted a consistent          
product – a news report – in which non-verbal elements were assessed,            
contextualized and interpreted in dialogue with the verbal data.  
Furthermore, my focus in this dissertation was on exploring strategic          
nar​ratives as such rather than on strategic narrative producers: governments,          
political leaders, media or non-governmental actors. Thus, my empirical         
material is limited to the content ​of television news. It says little about the              
actual processes behind producing the strategic narratives depicted in the          
news. Future studies of strategic narratives should therefore include         
empirical data about the ​news production process and how         
journalists and editors perceive their roles in that process​. The          
study also does not include data on ​direct audience effects of the framing             
of conflicts in strategic narratives. This should be followed up in forthcoming            
studies. Future research could also cover media outlets with an ​alternative           
political position in Russia, like the Dozhd television channel and ​Novaya           
Gazeta newspaper. I am also interested in continuing research from the           
hybrid media perspective on strategic narratives and exploring television         
news that goes viral online by being shared and discussed on social networks.             
The ​online discussions around the news produced by the mainstream          
media might be a fruitful area to investigate.  
6.3. C​ONCLUDING ​ ​REMARKS 
Strategic narrative is a complex, many-faceted phenomenon. Over the past          
few decades, scholars in media studies, political communications and         
international relations have extended our knowledge of the formation,         
projection and reception of strategic narratives (Freedman, 2006;        
Miskimmon et al., 2013; Roselle et al., 2014; Szostek, 2016). However, many            
of the important existing findings concern how strategic narratives impact          
the power transition, domestic and international legitimacy and the         
construction or recognition of one’s own or others’ identities. This          
dissertation contributes to the literature by examining ​how strategic         
narratives evolve over time and, specifically, ​how the mass media contributes           
to and reflects the changing relationship between countries. These insights          
answer, in part, Miskimmon et al.’s (2017) call for research on strategic            
narratives to examine the role of media in shaping the meaning of events and              
Arsenault et al.’s (2017) call for the analysis of the role of the media in               




dissertation reveal that strategic narratives are a fluid construction that is           
constantly being modified to suit changing political purposes. 
It is notable that there is growing scepticism about conventional          
media outlets on the internet. However, according to the data, the rhetoric            
used to express scepticism is also based on the terms of strategic narratives.             
This leads to the conclusion that – although the communication environment           
can change – the information consumption habits and engagement with          
television news are not changing very fast in Russia. Moreover, in           
comparison with other developed and more liberal countries, the Russian          
media environment empowers traditional actors like the national media and          
government officials. This provides a basis for Russia to use strategic           
narratives as a weapon in an ideological confrontation, whether inside the           
country or beyond its borders. 
The empirical analysis of news reports indicated that strategic         
narratives were crucial in how television channels framed and represented          
the conflicts in Ukraine and Syria. The narratives outlined were kept           
prominent with the help of the themes, plots and characters’ roles that the             
channels chose to communicate about the conflicts. Theoretically, then, this          
research deepens our understanding, from comparative, retrospective and        
hybrid media perspectives, of how significant events like international         
conflicts are constructed in accordance with political purposes and         
expectations, experiences and values of the target audience(s). The empirical          
data show how the mainstream media interprets the same conflict to           
different audiences or different conflicts to the same audience, how the           
media modify a narrative if international relations change and how the media            
(try to) support strategic narratives in the new media ecology. The analysis of             
the news has shown how the most important state-run channels contribute to            
the understanding of the contemporary information war and how Russia          
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